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ABSTRACT

This dissertation documents and evaluates certain financial and non-financial strategies
used by the public accounting profession to influence audit regulation during the policy
formation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The dissertation is
comprised of three separate, but related studies. Each study uses prior research in
accounting and related disciplines to investigate significant aspects the profession’s
strategies. The first study evaluates the rationality and effectiveness of political action
committee (PAC) contributions paid by the accounting profession to members of
Congress. The study finds that the accounting profession rationally allocated more PAC
contributions to top congressional leaders and to members of committees having
jurisdiction over SOX. The study also finds that the accounting profession allocated
more PAC contributions to legislators with a history of pro-business roll call voting
behavior and to candidates in close electoral races. This evidence suggests that the
profession is motivated to contribute cash to legislators in order to gain access to lobby
and to influence the ideological composition of the legislature. A voting model also finds
a positive relationship in two instances between PAC contributions and roll call voting
favorable to the economic interests of the profession in the House of Representatives.

The second study evaluates the effect of these PAC contributions on Committee
members’ frequency and mode of speech during public hearings related to SOX. Using
computerized computational linguistics, the study finds a significant positive association
iii

between PAC contributions and speech performance. The study also finds differential
uses of modals and certain verbs between legislators depending upon party affiliation.

The third paper explores the rhetoric of the accounting profession’s public interest ideal
and the profession’s motivation to invoke public interest arguments in various contexts. I
approach my analysis from three different perspectives. The first perspective analyzes
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric. The second
approach eschews any well-intentioned motivations on behalf of the profession and casts
public interest arguments as propaganda cloaking self-interested action. The third
approach deconstructs the public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of
elements including cultural values, political doctrine and contingent interests.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to document and evaluate political strategies and
tactics used by the public accounting profession and those of its constituents during the
policy formation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 (SOX). The dissertation is
comprised of three separate, but related studies. Each study uses prior research in
accounting and related disciplines to investigate significant aspects the profession’s
strategies. In this introductory chapter, I provide the overall motivation for the
dissertation and a brief summary of each study.

The maintained assumption of American society is that securities regulation fosters fair
and efficient capital markets by protecting investors from unfair and fraudulent practices
while maintaining investor confidence in those markets. Arguably, the persuasive appeal
of this rationale rests on providing the public equal access to the American Dream.
According to Merino and Mayper (2001), the American Dream is a combination of
Jeffersonian democracy, where all citizens have an equal opportunity to succeed, and
social Darwinism, a theory that justifies discrepancies in the distribution of wealth based
on performance. In other words, the American Dream promises “an equal opportunity to
be unequal” (p.506). According to this dream, legal and political structures should
protect equal access and opportunity, as well as personal property rights accumulated
through superior performance.

1

Another view, known as the Iron Law of Oligopoly, claims that society has a natural
tendency towards rule by the few (Michels, 1915). According to this theory, large
populations tend to specialize and delegate decision making to a few individuals who
naturally accumulate their own wealth and protect or enhance their power base.
Economic theories of regulation seem to support this view suggesting that powerful
interest groups seek control of regulatory structures for the economic benefit of their
members and to the detriment of broader segments of society (Stigler, 1971; Pelzman,
1976; Hirschleifer, 1976; Becker, 1986; Willmott; 1986; Sikka, 2001; Dwyer and
Roberts, 2004). Under this view, securities legislation such as SOX, can be seen as a
symbolic attempt to restore investor confidence and preserve the status quo following a
series of major market failures. At worst, SOX might be seen as an instrumental attempt
by politicians and regulators to exploit a crisis in order to protect their power base and
enhance their own interests.

SOX contained sweeping provisions affecting the responsibilities of publicly traded
companies and their auditors. Principal among these was the creation of a Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that effectively stripped the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) of its ability to regulate itself and set
auditing standards2. This legislation is important since it signaled an important shift
away from the self-regulatory structure established under the Securities and Exchange
Acts of 1933 and 19343. These Acts effectively established a monopoly status for the
2

U.S. public accounting profession in auditing the financial statements of publicly traded
companies. In exchange for this state-granted monopoly, the profession ostensibly
agreed to a fiduciary role infused with a mandate to operate in the public interest. This
role requires auditors to operate as independent, competent and objective referees
overseeing the production of financial information while performing their services under
strict professional standards (Roberts and Kurtenbach, 1998). Classic economic theory
suggests this role is necessary because the proper functioning of capital markets requires
investor confidence in the accuracy, completeness and reliability of the financial
information generated by publicly traded companies. In addition, since accounting and
auditing standards are complex, a condition of information asymmetry exists between
consumers and producers of financial information. To the extent that uninformed
consumers cannot evaluate the quality of financial information might subject them to
incompetence and fraud. Since the public cannot be reasonably expected to investigate
the qualifications of auditors, professional licensing acts as a symbol of quality and
presumably, protects the public from harm. Licensing also acts as a quality signal to
regulators enhancing the value of CPAs to their clients. Ayers, Jackson and Hite (1989)
found that licensing provided CPAs with a degree of protection and negotiating power in
practicing before the IRS allowing them to adopt more aggressive, pro-taxpayer positions
in ambiguous tax situations.

Some theorists however, have been critical of this arrangement, citing the potential for
‘regulatory capture.’ Regulatory capture describes a potential situation where regulated
3

industries end up dominating the regulatory structure for the economic benefit of their
members. Stigler’s economic theory of regulation (1971) suggests that industries and
occupations with sufficient political power will utilize the State to seek control of entry
and enact complimentary legislation in order to maximize their wealth. Pelzman (1976)
formalized this theory and predicted that political equilibrium will result when regulation
balances the marginal costs and benefits among the various interest groups affected.
Hirschleifer (1976) observed that regulators themselves are an interested group and that
when exogenous events disrupt an existing political equilibrium regulators tend to assure
that the associated costs (or benefits) of the correction are distributed among all parties.
Becker (1986) further refined this theory by including the consuming public as a
competing interest group. Taken in combination, these theories suggest that when
exogenous events occur, such as stock market crashes and major audit failures, the
political and regulatory structures undergo a correction wherein the rational and selfinterested members of various interest groups, including the accounting profession,
compete for relative economic advantage. Such a correction it seems occurred following
the collapse of Enron4. The magnitude and widespread impact of the losses demanded a
response from the political sector and battle lines were quickly drawn among the various
interest groups with an economic stake in the outcome. These interest groups included
the accounting profession and their clients, federal regulators, institutional investors,
stock exchanges, the investment and consumer banking industry, labor organizations,
consumers and even the politicians themselves. Consequently, drawing on Stigler’s
(1971) economic theory of regulation, the maintained assumption of this proposal is that
4

the accounting profession acted instrumentally in seeking to protect its economic interests
and those of its constituents during the policy formulation period of SOX.

While on the surface, SOX appears to have diminished the profession’s ability to selfregulate, it also appears to have contained hidden benefits for the accounting industry.
For example, SOX provides accountants with more opportunities for fee generation by
requiring a broader scope of attestation responsibilities, and reduces audit risk for
accountants by more explicitly placing the onus for accurate financial reporting upon
management. A study by Financial Executives International (2004) reported that
compliance with section 404 alone, concerning the documentation of internal accounting
controls, would increase external audit fees by an average of 38%, or $1.5 million per
company for the largest US Companies. Multiplying this amount by the 321 companies in
the survey indicates an increase of about a half a billion dollars in audit fees for the
profession. A cottage industry addressing the need for compliance with SOX has also
created unprecedented demand for accounting skills among students, boosting the salaries
for entry level accounting professors to a level on par with many medical school
professors (Gullapalli, 2004). Gullapalli (2004) goes so far as to say that after all the
publicity, students now perceive an exciting, “Elliot Ness-like” quality to accounting,
reminiscent of the FBI during the Depression. SOX also reduces audit risk for CPA’s
since CEO’s must now personally attest to the accuracy of their financial statements and
the strength of their internal control systems under threat of significant penalties. These
penalties range from forfeiture of bonuses and profits from the sale of securities to prison
5

time for failures and restatements. As a result, SOX appears to have solidified and
strengthened the professional status of CPAs.

Whether these hidden benefits were instrumentally or serendipitously included in SOX
by legislators allied to the profession is a question worthy of investigation. Willmott
(1986; pp.556) states that professional accountancy associations are “primarily, but not
exclusively, political bodies whose purpose is to define, organise, secure and advance the
interests of their (most vocal and influential) members.” Dwyer and Roberts (2004)
assert that the accounting profession is too closely aligned with the interest of large
multinational companies and that the profession exerts too much influence over U.S.
government policy. These sentiments are also echoed by other researchers concerned
that the inherently acquisitive nature and substantial political influence wielded by the
profession and its supporters legitimizes and sustains inequitable social structures
privileging particular interest groups to the detriment of society as a whole (Sikka, 2001;
Willmott and Sikka, 1997).

Empirical evidence in accounting research supports these concerns indicating a positive
relationship between the relative interest group strength of the profession and the
enactment of complimentary legislation. Young (1991) documented a positive
relationship between the relative interest-group strength of CPAs, measured by their
numbers relative to non-CPAs, and restrictive licensing regimes among state public
accounting regulations. Roberts and Kurtenbach (1998) found that state adoption of the
6

150 hour accounting education requirement was directly related to the ratio of state
licensed CPAs to non-CPAs and to the percentage of CPAs belonging to their State’s
society of CPAs. Donabedian (1991) found that licensing requirements for CPAs were
stricter in states with greater numbers of large businesses. Young (1988) found that prior
to the initiation of the Advisory Grading Service, CPA exam failure rates in California
and Illinois were associated with changes in economic conditions. These results suggest
that CPAs as an interest group engage in restrictive licensing practices in order to protect
the economic welfare of its members.

Other researchers have documented the strategies and tactics used by the accounting
profession and its constituents to influence regulation at the federal level (Dwyer and
Roberts, 2004; Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003). Roberts,
Dwyer and Sweeney (2003) documented a variety of strategies used by the accounting
profession to influence federal legislation related to auditor liability reform. Using
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of political strategies, Roberts et al (2003) concluded
that accounting firms and professional organizations have generally adopted a long-term
relational approach for influencing the political process that spans multiple issues.
Accounting firms participated individually and collectively through professional
organizations making extensive use of informational and financial incentive tactics and
modest use of constituency building tactics. According to Hillman and Hitt, (1999),
informational strategies seek to affect policy reform by providing policy makers
information regarding the relative costs and benefits of different regulatory options.
7

Examples of possible tactics used in an informational strategy include direct lobbying
efforts, reporting the results of research and surveys, providing expert testimony and
submitting white papers or technical reports. Financial strategies seek to align the
interests of the policy makers with those of the industry by using monetary incentives.
Tactics used in a financial strategy might include campaign contributions, either directly
from an individual or through a political action committee, paying travel expenses and
honoraria for speaking engagements and hiring politician’s relatives or subordinates as
paid political consultants. A constituency building strategy attempts to build support for
desired legislation from the “bottom-up” by influencing voter beliefs through tactics of
advertising, slogans, press releases or other public relations programs. Roberts, et al
(2003) further tested for the effectiveness of these strategies on roll call voting, and found
a significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC) contributions
by the accounting profession to committee members and roll call voting behavior
favorable to the interests of the industry.

Dwyer and Roberts (2004) analyzed the political contributions made by the accounting
profession to legislators during the 1997-1998 federal election cycle and found that the
profession shows a preference for legislators with conservative, pro-business ideologies.
Roberts and Bobek (2004) tested the relationship between corporate PAC contributions
and legislators ability to affect tax law changes. Their evidence indicates that large
corporations used PAC contributions in an apparent effort to negotiate contracts with the
state concerning legislation directly affecting their tax burden or the demand for their
8

products. These studies provide strong evidence that accounting firms, both individually
and collectively have been making extensive use of lobbying and PAC contributions in
efforts to influence legislation favorable to the profession and its constituents.

This stream of research is important in order to document the extent to which sectional
interest groups, such as the accounting profession, influence the political process
concerning legislation having a direct economic impact on its members. To the extent
that the accounting profession has been effective in transferring wealth to its members
through political activity or influence undermines its public interest mandate and
challenges the rationale for providing it monopoly status.

DESCRIPTION OF STUDIES
The purpose of the first study is to determine whether the political contributions paid by
the accounting profession to Congress were rational and effective in protecting or
promoting the economic interests of the profession during the formulation of SOX. The
study documents the monetary contributions paid by the political action committees
(PACS) of the AICPA and Big 5 accounting firms to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate and develops a model to test for any relationship between
these payments and membership on committees having jurisdiction over SOX. The study
extends previous research by evaluating the rationality of PAC contributions paid by the
accounting profession to legislators having jurisdiction over legislation affecting audit
9

regulation. The working hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between PAC
contributions paid by the accounting profession and legislators membership on those
committees having jurisdiction over audit regulation.

The first stage of the analysis tests the relationship between PAC contributions and SOX
relevant committee membership while controlling for political ideology, electoral
competition, leadership position and membership on related committees. The SOX
relevant committees include the House Committee on Financial Services chaired by
Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-OH), and the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs chaired by Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD)5. The general
specification for the model is linear, with PAC contributions as the dependent variable.
The results indicate that the accounting profession rationally allocated relatively higher
levels of financial resources to pro-business legislators, members of committees having
jurisdiction over issues relevant to the profession, including the committees with
jurisdiction over SOX and to members engaged in close electoral races.

In the second stage of the analysis, the working hypothesis is that legislators repay such
political debts with favorable roll call voting behavior. Recent research in accounting has
found a significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC)
contributions by the profession to legislators and roll call voting behavior limiting
accountants liability in securities litigation (Roberts, et al, 2003). This finding suggests
that financial incentives may be an effective strategy for influencing roll call votes
10

concerning audit regulation, especially when public salience of the issue is low. In a
further test of this relationship, I test of the effectiveness of PAC contributions in
influencing legislators voting behavior using a probit regression model while controlling
for political ideology and party loyalty. The dependent variable is dichotomous,
representing affirmative or negative votes on amendments or motions relevant to the
accounting profession.

The final roll call vote on SOX was unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the
House, so the analysis focuses on roll call votes concerning amendments relevant to the
accounting profession. The results of the analysis in the House indicate a positive
association between PAC contributions and roll call voting behavior favorable to the
interests of the accounting profession on at least two amendments relevant to the
profession. There was no statistical association between PAC contributions and roll call
voting behavior in the Senate.

In an attempt to bring in alternative empirical approaches and evidence into the debate
concerning PAC contributions and policy formation, the second study adopts a linguistic
perspective. This perspective assumes that language mediates audit policy formulation,
and that distributors of PAC money should favor legislators allied with the accounting
profession who use persuasive language during public debate. Adopting an empirical
linguistic approach opens up new avenues of investigation in the analysis of the political
process and adds a new dimension to existing corporate political activity frameworks.
11

In this study, I evaluate the association between PAC contributions and legislator’s
speech performance. The working hypothesis is that legislators receiving PAC money
reciprocate by arguing more frequently and emphatically on issues in favor of the
profession. Overall, the results suggest there was a positive association between PAC
contributions and speech among Republican committee members in the House.
However, the association between PAC contributions among Non-republicans was not
significant in either the House or the Senate committee hearings.

The third paper in this dissertation represents a philosophical discussion of the accounting
profession with respect to its public interest mandate and questions whether the rhetoric
of the accounting profession is consistent with the behavior of its members. The purpose
of this paper is to examine the nature of the public interest ideal as promulgated by the
public accounting profession in the United States and explore what motivates the
profession to invoke public interest arguments in various contexts. In so doing, I also
explore the elasticity and ambivalence of the term public interest while arguing that it is
in and of itself part of the mystification process used by the profession to maintain its
self-regulatory status.

I approach my analysis from three different perspectives. The first perspective analyzes
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric. I define
rhetoric in the traditional Aristotelian sense, i.e. as persuasive appeals based on logic,
emotion and/or authority while assuming a functionalist perspective consistent with the
12

public interest model of the professions. I illustrate how the profession uses the rhetoric
of the public interest as a measure of proper comportment for its members, to reassure
regulators and the investing public of the benevolent motivations of the profession, and to
maintain the stability of global capital markets.

The second approach adopts a critical perspective. This view eschews any altruistic
motivations on behalf of the profession and casts the language of the public interest as
propaganda intended to support the economic objectives of professional elites in a highly
concentrated monopolistic industry and those of their corporate clients. Using examples,
I illustrate the instrumental use of the public interest ideal by the accounting profession to
defend its self-regulatory status in times of crisis, as justification to extend its
jurisdictional claims and to minimize its exposure to liability from audit failures.

The final perspective focuses on the ambivalence of language and attempts to reveal how
the true nature of the public interest is ‘undecidable’. This perspective deconstructs
(Derrida, 1982) the public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of elements
including cultural values, political doctrine and contingent interests. I use the term myth
as both allegory and parable. Myths are similar to allegory in the in the sense that they
exist as symbolic representations for meanings other than those indicated on the surface.
They are also similar to parables, being fictitious stories illustrating historically
embedded moral attitudes. I rely on myths as the symbolic representations of an ideal
reality to describe the simultaneous and contradictory attitudes present in the public
13

interest ideal and the inherent instability between what is written and what is read, or
what is spoken and what is heard. A deconstructive reading of the public interest ideal
reveals how its central meaning is always on the move, uniquely reified by readers in
context, and how any fixed meaning cannot be sustained. I believe that this paper
advances prior critical work because I focus on the instrumental use of the public interest
ideal as a rhetorical strategy while acknowledging and addressing the differences in
meaning attached to the use of this ideal both by members of the profession as well as
external groups.

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION
Each of the three papers presented in this dissertation highlights an alternative ontological
and epistemological perspective. The first study evaluates the rationality and
effectiveness of PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession with respect to
legislation concerning audit regulation by documenting cash paid and votes cast. Using
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) descriptions of paradigms, the PAC study is functionalist
given that the held assumptions are ontologically realist and the epistemology is positive
science. This view assumes that external circumstances condition individuals and their
behavior.

The second study introduces some subjectivity into the analysis by using thematic coding
and keyword lists yet retains a positive science perspective by empirically modeling
14

speech performance. Investigating the discourse of legislators in the context of
congressional committee hearings and testing for a relationship between speech
performance and financial support from the accounting profession opens new avenues of
research semantic analysis that can be applied to a variety of accounting narratives
including annual reports, note disclosures, Chairman’s statements and SEC filings.

The philosophical stance of the third and final study of this dissertation is critical. It is
amethodical in its approach and ambivalent with respect to whether first or third person
conscious experiences are real. The study evaluates the rhetoric of the accounting
profession with respect to its public interest mandate using three fundamentally different
perspectives. The first perspective assumes the rhetoric is driven by functional pluralistic
motivations and evaluates the public interest discourse using traditional modes of
persuasion, i.e. logical, emotional and authoritative. The second perspective adopts a
more critical approach that portrays the rhetoric of the public interest as a glittering and
virtuous generality linked to the highly valued ideals of self-sacrifice and benevolence
while obfuscating underlying instrumental motivations. The third and final approach
deconstructs the public interest ideal to reveal the simultaneous and contradictory
attitudes present in the discourse highlighting the inherent instability between what is
written and what is read, or what is spoken and what is heard.

In summary, this dissertation portrays three studies in accounting along a continuum of
epistemologies, each maintaining alternative assumptions regarding the nature of reality.
15

The methods used range from the precise and quantitative to the fuzzy and qualitative. I
believe that accounting research can benefit from these alternative perspectives because
the practice of accounting is inherently humanistic, incorporating fields of sociology,
politics, law and language that have heretofore, proved rather impervious to mathematical
analysis.
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Endnotes

1

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 more formally known as HR3763, the Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 (CAARTA) became Public Law 107-204 on
July 30, 2002 after a unanimous vote of in the Senate (99-0) and a near unanimous vote in the House (4233). HR3763 was sponsored by Representative Michael G. Oxley, R-OH, and incorporated S2673, the
Public Company Accounting reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 sponsored by Senator Paul S.
Sarbanes, D-MD.
2
Title I established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to “…establish or adopt,
or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports for issuers, in accordance with section 103.2” Section 103 provided the
PCAOB wide latitude in seeking standard setting direction from outside sources, including, but not limited
to the accounting profession. However, the PCAOB ultimately decided not to delegate this standard setting
authority to the accounting profession. On April 18, 2003 the board issued Release 2003-5 “Statement
regarding establishment of accounting standards” stating:
“The Board has, however, determined not to exercise the authority afforded it in Section 103 to designate
or recognize any professional group of accountants to propose standards. This release generally describes
the manner in which the Board intends to discharge these responsibilities and proposes PCAOB Rule 3700,
which would govern the formation, composition and role of the advisory group in the Board’s standard
setting process.”
The potential significance of this release was commented on in the September 2003 issue of The CPA
Journal (NYSCPA): “On Wednesday, the new oversight board voted to formally strip the [AICPA] of its
authority to set auditing standards, retaining that power for itself. The decision is a further blow to the
institute, the accounting professions leading trade group. This conclusion is in sharp contrast to what the
first group of SEC commissioners determined at their initial meeting. That first group of commissioners
decided to rely on the “profession” for rules and self-regulation.”
3
The Securities Act of 1933 requires securities issuers and others to register with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and set standards for disclosure for publicly traded securities, specifically requiring
registrants to file audited financial statement information certified by an independent public or certified
accountant. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 delegated responsibility for enforcement to the SEC. The
SEC was given statutory authority to set accounting standards, however it typically looked to the private
sector for leadership in this endeavor.
4
What followed the collapse of Enron has been called a witch-hunt as a variety of interest groups accused
each other of being implicated or responsible for the scandals. However, attention quickly focused on
Arthur Andersen, LLP, Enron’s auditor of sixteen years. The SEC set up a special Enron task force on
December 17, 2001, the day following Enron’s press release announcing a $618 million net loss for the
third quarter of 2001 and a $1.2 billion write-down of Enron shareholder equity. The task force
immediately sent a written request to Arthur Andersen for Enron related documents. The court record
indicates that Andersen engaged in large scale document shredding until it received a formal subpoena
from the SEC on November 8, 2001. These actions ultimately contributed to the demise of the revered
‘Big 5’ accounting firm. On March 7, 2002, Arthur Andersen, LLP was indicted in the US District Court,
Southern District of Texas on for obstruction of justice, a charge it was convicted of on June 15, 2002 and
sentenced to 5 years probation with a $500,000 fine. In August 2002, the state of Texas stripped Andersen
of its auditing license, and the firm ultimately collapsed as clients fled to other firms.

19

5

The defection of Senator Jim Jeffords (I-VT) from the Republican party during the 107th Congress shifted
the balance of power in the Senate from 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans to 50 Democrats, 49
Republicans and 1 Independent giving control of the Senate and each committee to the Democrats.
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I) STUDY ONE THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND PAC
CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM SARBANES OXLEY

INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom on the influence of money in politics suggests that it
undermines the twin pillars of the democratic process: representation and participation.
First, it assumes that interested money can buy legislative favors and/or elective offices.
If this is true, then interested money in politics undermines the equality of the one person,
one vote system and skews political representation in the legislature towards the wealthy.
A corollary to this view is that public disgust with the influence of money in politics
causes voters to withdraw from the democratic process. Critics point out that voter
turnout has dropped as the level of campaign spending has increased over the last several
years. However, much to the chagrin of researchers, empirical evidence of a causal link
between campaign contributions and legislative favors has been difficult to find.

A competing view is that in any democracy governed by majority rule, there will be
disenfranchised minorities. The important issue is determining the best way to minimize
the negative impacts of majority rule on these minority groups. Pure democracy (one-
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person, one vote) assumes that all persons have an equal stake in a specific outcome and
that the intensity of their interests is the same. Clearly, this is not the case. Mechanisms
exist in representative democracy to adjust for these differences by giving more or less
weight to the needs of the minorities. To the extent that interested money from
minorities, such as accountants, can influence the leaders and legislative agendas of
special committees, gives them a disproportionate voice in the political process, but this
may be justified since accountants are a minority and may have more at stake in the
legislative outcome.

In this study, I draw on extant economic theories of regulation and political economy to
undertake an examination of PAC contributions made by the accounting profession to
Congress during the policy formulation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and evaluate
their effectiveness in influencing the voting behavior of Congress. Recent empirical
work focused on the magnitude and nature of the accounting profession’s influence in
federal politics indicate that the both the accounting profession and its corporate sponsors
have successfully used PAC contributions to negotiate favorable economic contracts with
the state (Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003). Roberts and
Bobek (2004) tested for the significance of the relationship between corporate PAC
contributions and legislators ability to affect tax law changes. Their evidence indicates
that large corporations used PAC contributions in attempts to negotiate contracts with the
state concerning legislation directly affecting their tax burden or the demand for their
products. Roberts, et al (2003) found a significant positive correlation between political
action committee (PAC) contributions by the accounting profession to committee
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members and roll call voting behavior on liability reform favorable to the interests of the
industry. Dwyer and Roberts (2004) analyzed the political contributions made by the
accounting profession to legislators during the 1997-1998 federal election cycle and
found that the profession shows a preference for legislators with conservative, probusiness ideologies. These studies reveal a statistically significant linkage between PAC
contributions and policy formulation suggesting that the U.S. public accounting
profession and its corporate sponsors use financial incentives to influence policy
formulation having a material impact on their members. These studies also challenge the
pluralistic assumption that political power of sectional interest groups in the U.S. is
widely diffused implying business interests now dominate the U.S. federal political
process. This study extends this stream of research by examining the political influence
of the accounting profession in formulating Federal legislation concerning the regulation
of auditors.

THEORY

Economic theories of regulation predict that powerful special interest groups will try to
capture the legislative process in order to promote the economic welfare of their
members. According to these theories, regulated industries, such as the accounting
profession, seek complimentary legislation to restrict entry into their industry and/or
increase demand for their products and services (Stigler, 1971; Pelzman, 1976,
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Hirschleifer, 1976, Becker, 1986; Roberts and Kurtenbach, 1998; Donabedian, 1991;
Young, 1991). According to Stigler (1971), industries that seek such complimentary
regulation from the state must be willing to pay with two things that legislators need:
votes and resources. This conjecture is consistent with theories of political economy that
assert politicians seek both monetary and non-monetary resources to promote their
conception of good policy, get re-elected and gain the recognition of their legislative
peers (Leyden, 1995; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi, 2002). Monetary resources can
come in the form of direct cash contributions, subsidized expenses or honorariums for
speaking engagement and other services. Non-monetary resources may take the form of
blocs of votes, policy expertise and influence over important economic and legislative
actors. The costs to politicians associated with attracting these resources come in two
general varieties. The first cost is the potential loss of votes or other resources by shifting
policies in favor of the contributing group and alienating others. A second cost may be
the disutility suffered by the politician in expending effort to perform services for a
contributing group rather than engaging in other personally preferable legislative
activities.

Contributors, on the other hand, may give resources for at least two reasons. The first
reason is to gain access to existing politicians. The access hypothesis does not necessarily
stipulate that interest groups pay contributions to affect policy. Quid pro quo exchanges
of votes for money are illegal under bribery statutes and both legislators and contributors
have incentives to avoid any such appearances. Rather, it suggests that contributions are
a signal to the legislator regarding the value of the information the interest group has on
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an issue (de Figueiredo, 2002). Once an interest group gains access to a legislator, they
can engage in a more valuable activity, namely lobbying. The correlation between PAC
contributions and lobbying expenditures is quite high. Ansolabehere, et al, (2002) found
that 70% of all lobbying expenditures and 86% of all PAC contributions come from a
small fraction (20%) of interest groups that have both PACs and lobbyists. Groups
without PACs tend to spend little on lobbying.

Another reason special interest groups contribute resources is to support the incumbency
of legislators with similar political agendas and/or change the composition of the
legislature to one that is more ideologically compatible with the interests of the group.
Poole and Daniels (1985) found that political ideology explains 80% of all roll call voting
with party loyalty explaining an additional 7%. Consequently, lobbying legislators with
similar political ideologies should be more cost effective since fewer units of access
would be required to convince the legislator of the value of the preferred policy.
According to this reasoning, powerful members, such as committee chairs, party leaders
and pivotal legislators should also be able to sell more units of access at the going market
price relative to other members because they are able to deliver effective service at a
lower cost per unit of access (Ansolabehere, et al, 2002).

While few doubt that PAC contributions are an important component of the political
process, there is considerable debate concerning their purpose or effectiveness in
influencing policy outcomes. A significant amount of research in the political economy
literature suggests that PAC contributions are not a very important phenomenon (Milyo,
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Primo and Groseclose, 2000; de Figueiredo, 2002). The reasons given for this claim
include the lack of a consistent link between PAC contributions and the activities of
legislators and the relatively small amount of PAC contributions when compared to
lobbying expenses or even philanthropic expenditures (Milyo, 2002). According to this
line of reasoning, PAC contributions may merely be evidence of symbolic gifts, such as
fruit-baskets, intended to maintain ongoing relationships with legislators, rather than payfor-performance contracting. A recent meta-analysis by Roscoe and Jenkins (2005) of the
impact of campaign contributions on roll call voting found that models with a measure
controlling for ideology and more than one contributions variable were less likely to
produce results. They concluded that about a third of the roll call votes exhibited an
impact from contributions. These inconsistent results are not surprising given the illegal
status of political pay-for-performance contracts. Moreover, legislators often receive
money from various industries with conflicting interests making such exchanges difficult
if not impossible to consummate. The result is a convoluted and complex legislative
process that tends to obscure the exact mechanisms of political contracting and hinders
attempts to establish a direct linkage between cash payments and policy formulation.
Major agreements are often brokered in private by legislators engaged in long-term
logrolling activities, where votes on particular issues are given in exchange for past or
future support on other issues.

Recent evidence of a high correlation between lobbying expenditures and PAC
contributions (Ansolabehere, et al., 2002) coupled with the absence of a demonstrable
link between PAC contributions and policy outcomes suggests the unlikely scenario that
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lobbying is also independent of policy outcomes. This finding stands in contrast to
numerous case studies suggesting that lobbying and information transfer greatly affect
voting behavior in congress and influence administrative decisions (de Figueiredo, 2002).
In fact, de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002) found that the average return for a dollar of
lobbying expenditure was $11 to $45 for universities represented by legislators on
powerful appropriations committees. Ansolabehere, et al. (2002) suggest that this
apparent paradox may be resolved by disaggregating PAC contributions and lobbying
expenditures and analyzing them by industry sector.

POLITICAL SPENDING BY THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

The Center for Responsive Politics1 reports that accountants contributed $15,354,0562 to
federal candidates during the 2000 election cycle while spending $21,777,4323 on
lobbying, a ratio of 1.4 to 1. This ratio is significantly lower than the average 10 to 1
ratio reported for all groups by Ansolabehere, et al. (2002). The assumption is that
groups with low lobby-PAC ratios place relatively less importance on access as opposed
to supporting candidates with similar political ideologies. Groups with higher lobbyingPAC ratios are assumed to be more interested in access for lobbying activities and tend to
exhibit more balanced, bipartisan patterns of giving, ostensibly because the services they
desire can be performed equally well by many different types of legislators.
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Empirical evidence indicates that accountants do show favoritism toward pro-business
candidates giving on average, twice as much to Republican candidates than to democrats.
(Dwyer and Roberts, 2004). However, accountants can also gain ‘free’ access to
legislators by paying in kind with policy expertise, thus reducing the need to buy access
with PAC contributions. The analysis in table I-1 shows that there is considerable
variation in lobbying to PAC ratios among the major accounting firms and the AICPA,
ranging from 1.4:1 to 7.8:1. Therefore, the relative ability of firms to gain free access and
the relative importance of access versus ideology among firms may be firm specific.

Table I-1. Ratio of Lobbying to PAC Contributions
Big Five and AICPA 1998 and 2000 Election Cycles
Election
Cycle
Lobbying
PAC
1998

Arthur
Andersen
4,365,000
559,586
7.8

Deloitte &
Touche
1,145,000
820,379
1.4

Ernst &
Young
2,800,000
1,039,741
2.69

KPMG
1,020,000
633,785
1.61

PWC
1,860,000
1,159,675
1.6

AICPA
3,836,297
1,244,414
3.08

Total
15,026,297
5,457,580
2.75

Lobbying
4,320,000*
3,414,000
2,400,000 2,190,000
PAC
762,999*
1,092,095
1,193,886 733,437
2000
5.66*
3.13
2.01
2.99
* Amounts represent only one year in the two-year cycle.

2,645,000
912,591
2.9

6,808,432
1,079,244
6.31

21,777,432
5,774,252
3.77

The preceding theory suggests at least three complimentary hypotheses. The first set of
questions involve whether or not the accounting profession is engaged in pay-forperformance contracting. The economic theory of regulation suggests that accountants
will give rationally to powerful legislative members who can influence policy outcomes,
including leaders and members on committee having jurisdiction over issues relevant to
the profession. Under this hypothesis, the held assumption is that PAC contributions are
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given to influence specific legislation, either as payment for reciprocal voting behavior or
as fees paid to gain access for lobbying activities. The second hypothesis suggested by
the political economy literature is that accountants are a low access demand group with
high ideological concerns who use PAC contributions to change the composition of the
legislature rather than to influence specific policies. The relatively low lobbying demand
ratio exhibited by accountants suggests that as a group, the accounting profession may
use PAC money more as an electoral strategy rather than to gain access to incumbent
legislators. Assuming that accountants do target specific legislators or electoral
candidates, a related question concerns the effectiveness of PAC contributions in
influencing their votes. Therefore, the third hypothesis is that members of the committees
having jurisdiction over SOX who received PAC contributions from accountants
reciprocated by casting roll call votes in favor of the profession on SOX related motions
and amendments. I consider these hypotheses complimentary since they are not mutually
exclusive. That is, accountants may use PAC contributions in pay-for-performance
contracting, to gain access to powerful incumbent legislators and/or to support specific
candidates with complimentary ideologies.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

The first stage of the analysis examines whether the accounting profession rationally
allocated more monetary resources during the 2002 election cycle to leaders, powerful
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committees members or to candidates in close electoral races. Specifically, I test for PAC
contributions to members of the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development because these committees had
direct jurisdictional authority over the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This stage of the analysis
also determines whether the accounting profession allocated relatively more monetary
resources to candidates in close electoral races. The held assumption is that PAC
contributions paid by the accounting profession favor candidates with more pro-business
ideologies. Stated more formally, these hypotheses assert:

H1a:

The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to members of the

Congressional committees having jurisdiction over SOX than to other members of
Congress.
H1b:

The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to Congressional

members with pro-business voting records.
H1c:

The accounting profession paid more PAC contributions to Congressional

members in close electoral races.

The second stage of the analysis attempts to determine whether PAC contributions have
any significant effect on the voting behavior of committee members having direct
jurisdiction over SOX with respect to specific provisions of SOX relevant to the
economic interests of the profession. This is a more direct test of the pay-for-performance
hypothesis versus the token gift hypothesis. Formally, this hypothesis asserts:

30

H2:

There will be a positive relationship between PAC contributions paid by the

accounting profession to Congress and roll call voting favorable to the interests of the
profession.

I do not expect any relationship to exist on the final vote on SOX, given that it was
unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the House. However, there were some
important motions and amendments proposed during its consideration that would have
had a material economic impact on the profession, and the roll call votes on these issues
reveal deeper divisions between congressional members.

DATA ANALYSIS

I collected the data on PAC contributions for Arthur Andersen, Deloitte and Touche,
Ernst and Young, KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the AICPA from the web site for
the Center for Responsive Politics. I collected all other data, including leadership
positions, committee memberships, voting record and percentage of the vote received in
the last election from the Congressional record and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The
House of Representatives began the 107th legislative cycle with 220 Republicans, 211
Democrats, 2 Independents, 5 Delegates and 2 vacancies. 383 representatives were men,
55 women, and 41 were newly elected. The House sample contained 392 observations
from a total of 440 seats. The two vacancies, five delegates and 41 were newly elected
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members were excluded from the analysis. The descriptive statistics for the House
sample in Table I-2 show that there are relatively few powerful legislators in leadership
or committee assignments.

Table I-2. Descriptive Statistics for the U.S. House of Representatives Sample
Accounting profession PAC Contribution to the U.S. House of Representatives
Group
Indicator variables
Member of Top
Leadership (LEADER)
Member of Energy and
Commerce Committee
or Ways and Means
Committee (RELATED)
Member of House
Financial Services
Committee (FINANCE)
Member of the
Republican party
(PARTY)
Continuous variables
Ideology
(USCC106)

1

N
8

Mean
PAC
18,197*

Std. Dev.
17,008

0

384

4,963*

7,559

1

41

8,116**

7,169

0

351

4,896**

8,079

1

60

11,207***

10,475

0

332

4,153***

7,013

1

199

7,040***

8,972

0

193

3,479***

6,585

Variable Description

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

U.S. Chamber of Commerce voting record for the
106th Congressional cycle. Higher ratings are
pro-business (0-100).
One minus the percentage of the vote received in
the previous election.

392

0.61

0.28

392

0.30

0.13

Variable Description
1 if the legislator holds a top leadership
position, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a
committee membership in a committee
that has jurisdiction over tax legislation
or other legislation related to the
accounting profession, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a
committee membership in a committee
that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0
otherwise.
1 if Republican, 0 otherwise.

Electoral Competition
(ELECT)
Correlation matrix
PAC
LEADER
PAC
LEADER†
.233***
RELATED†
.123**
-.027
.316***
-.032
FINANCE†
USCC106
.321***
.194
ELECT
.197***
.031
PARTY
.225***
.211
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-Tailed)
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-Tailed)
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-Tailed)
†
Dichotomous variable

RELATED

FINANCE

USCC106

ELECT

-.145***
.035
-.041
.065

.006
.050
.023

.238***
.885***

.168***
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Regarding the prevailing congressional ideology, the average USCC ratings for all
legislators in the sample is relatively pro-business, indicating they vote in favor of the US
Chamber of Commerce agenda 61% of the time. T-tests of differences in mean PAC
contributions paid by the accounting profession were significant in the expected direction
for all variables of interest. The accounting profession paid three times as much to the
top leadership of the House of Representatives. These included Party Leaders, Party
Whips, Chairs of the Financial Services or related committees and the House Speaker.
The profession also paid more money on average to members of the Financial Services or
related committees and to Republican party members. The measure of electoral
competition shows that House members captured an average 70% of the vote in the
previous election.

In order to test the hypothesis of whether the accounting profession allocated relatively
more money to members of important committees having jurisdiction over SOX, I follow
Roberts and Bobek (2004) and Roberts, et al (2003) by using a tobit model of PAC
contributions paid by the accounting profession against committee membership
controlling for political ideology, leadership and industry-related committee membership.
I also borrow from Ansolabehere, et al (2002) by adding a variable to measure electoral
competition. A tobit model is used because the distribution of PAC contributions is
censored below zero and significantly skewed to the right (Roberts and Bobek, 2004;
Roberts, et al, 2003; Chappell, 1982). These data characteristics cause regular OLS
estimates to be inconsistent and biased toward zero. The general specification of the
model is:
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PAC = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2LEADER + b3RELATED + b4FINANCE + b5ELECT
Where:

PAC =

Legislators total receipt of PAC contributions from the accounting
profession.

USCC106 =

Legislators cumulative voting record rated by the U.S, Chamber of
Commerce voting record for the 106th Congress. Higher ratings are probusiness (0-100).

LEADER =

1 if the legislator holds a top leadership position, 0 otherwise.

RELATED = 1 if the legislator is a member of holds a committee membership in a
committee that has jurisdiction over tax legislation or other legislation
related to the accounting profession, 0 otherwise.
FINANCE = 1 if the legislator is a member of holds a committee membership in a
committee that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0 otherwise.
ELECT =

One minus the percentage of the vote received in the previous election. I
record unopposed elections at 0%.

Interpreting the coefficients of the tobit model can be difficult. According to McDonald
and Moffitt (1980), the direction and statistical significance of the tobit coefficients can
be interpreted the same as regular regression, but the marginal effects of the independent
variables must be scaled for the probability that the latent variable will actually be
observed. In the case of the PAC contribution model, the latent dependent variable can be
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described as the desire or the propensity of the accounting profession to contribute to a
given legislator. The profession makes no payment until this desire reaches a certain
threshold at which point the payment becomes observable. The probability of observing
a payment changes as the levels of the independent variables change. Tobit models were
tested using the statistical software package LIMDEP, which is designed especially for
tests that contain a limited dependent variable. LIMDEP calculates the conditional mean
of the model at a sample point where all the independent variables are at their mean and
then scales the coefficients by the probability that a payment will be made. The results of
the model for the House of Representatives sample are in table I-3.

Table I-3. Tobit model of PAC Contributions for U.S. House of Representatives
PAC1000 = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2LEADER + b3RELATED + b4FINANCE + b5ELECT
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-12.94
1.81
-7.45 (.000)
-7.56*
USCC106
+
14.28
2.02
7.07 (.000)
8.34*
0.61
LEADER
+
13.96
3.40
4.11 (.000)
8.16*
0.02
RELATED
+
7.03
1.63
4.31 (.000)
4.11*
0.10
FINANCE
+
10.77
1.38
7.80 (.000)
6.29*
0.15
ELECT
+
11.53
4.30
2.68 (.008)
6.74*
0.30
Sigma =9.33 (σ=.44, SE=20.92, p-value= .0000)
Log Likelihood function -971.68
Conditional Mean at sample point: 4.80
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.58
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables
(One-tailed p-values can be used for directional predictions.)
* Marginal effects significant at .01

All variables of interest were significant in the expected direction in support of
hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. The most important predictor of PAC contributions made to
members of the House of Representatives during the 107th Congress was political
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ideology followed by electoral competition and committee membership. The marginal
effects for political ideology and top leadership position were twice that of membership
on related committees and a third more for election tightness and membership on the
Financial Services Committee. The statistically significant and positive coefficients for
the FINANCE and RELATED variables indicates that the accounting profession
allocated relatively higher levels of financial resources to members of the House
Financial Services Committee having jurisdiction over SOX and to other House
committees relevant to the economic well being of the profession. This result suggests
that the profession is concerned with gaining access to these committee members,
ostensibly to lobby them on behalf of its membership and/or their clients. The
statistically significant and positive coefficient for the ELECT variable indicates the
accounting profession also allocated relatively more PAC money to candidates in close
elections. This result suggests that the accounting profession is concerned with
controlling the composition of the legislature. Further analysis was conducted on the
interaction between electoral tightness and political ideology to test whether the
profession was biased in giving more to pro-business candidates in close elections, but
the results were inconclusive. I used two models to test the interaction between political
ideology and election tightness. In the first model, USCC106 and ELECT alone were
regressed against PAC contributions using ordinary least squares. The coefficients for
both variables were significant (α = .01) in the expected direction. In the second model,
an interactive variable [USCC106*(1-ELECT107)] was added to test for the interaction
between election tightness and ideology. The results of the second model indicated that
the coefficients for both election tightness and ideology were not significant while the
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interactive variable was significant. This result suggests that the profession is interested
in controlling the ideological composition of the legislature by giving more contributions
to pro-business candidates who likely face close elections. When the interaction was
tested using the censored model, the results indicated that political ideology was the only
significant predictor even after the interactive variable for election tightness was
introduced. Consequently, the proposition that political ideology moderates contributions
to candidates in close elections remains unresolved and left to future research.

Extending the analysis to the Senate, I add an indicator variable (ELECTYR) to the
model as suggested by Roberts and Bobek (2004) to control for election year variation.
Unlike the House of Representative, where all incumbents are up for re-election every
two years, Senators serve 6 year staggered terms and their receipts from PACs tend to
increase during election years. I also add an interactive variable to control for the
potential interaction between election year increases and membership on other
committees relevant to the profession (ELECTYR*RELATED).

The final Senate sample contained 88 observations since 12 members were newly elected
and were not rated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The descriptive statistics shown
in table I-4 support the hypothesis that senators facing re-election receive substantially
more PAC contributions from the accounting profession.
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Table I-4. Descriptive Statistics U.S. Senate Sample
Descriptive Statistics
Indicator variables
Member of Leadership
Team (LEADER)
Member of Senate
Finance Committee or
Joint Committee on
Taxation (RELATED)
Member of Senate
Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban
Affairs (BANK)
Election Year
(ELECTYR)

Variable Description

Std. Dev.

4

Mean
PAC
10,395

0

84

6,332

10,040

1 if the legislator is a member of holds a
committee membership in a committee
that has jurisdiction over tax legislation
or other legislation related to the
accounting profession, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a member of holds a
committee membership in a committee
that has jurisdiction over S-O, 0
otherwise.

1

20

5,669

10,874

0

68

6,766

10,290

1

16

9,856

13,381

0

72

5,775

9,536

1 if it is an election year, 0 otherwise

1

33

15,878***

11,917

0

55

900***

1,869

1

47

8,312*

11,284

0

41

4,459*

8,914

1 if the legislator holds a leadership
position, 0 otherwise.

Group

N

1

17,616

Member of the
Republican party
(PARTY)
Continuous variables

1 if Republican, o otherwise
Variable Description

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Ideology
(USCC106)

U.S. Chamber of Commerce voting record for the
106th Congressional cycle. Higher ratings are
pro-business (0-100). (Twelve members were
unrated)
One minus the percentage of the vote received in
the previous election.

88

.63

.26

88

.40

.08

Electoral Competition
(ELECT)
Correlation matrix
PAC

LEADER†

RELATED
†

PAC
LEADER†
-.082
RELATED†
-.045
.142
.153
.039
-.185
BANK†
USCC106
.250**
-.053
.026
ELECTYR†
.703***
-.056
-.084
ELECT
-.319***
-.082
.285***
PARTY
.186
-.015
-.037
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed)
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed)
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed)
†Dichotomous variable
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BANK†

USCC106

.037
-.000
-.077
-.027

.167
.000
.901***

ELECTYR

ELECT

.384***
.112

-.034

†

During the 107th congressional election cycle, senators facing re-election received almost
$15,000 more in PAC contributions from the profession than those not facing re-election.
The data also indicate that Republicans received about twice as much from the profession
than non-republicans. Independent sample T tests did not find any statistical difference
in PAC contributions paid by the profession based on committee membership or
leadership position. Mean ratings on political ideology remain comparable to the House
data, while electoral competition in the Senate appears stronger. As expected, the
correlation matrix indicates a significant positive association between PAC contributions
and pro-business voting record, election tightness and election year.

Table I-5 shows the results of the tobit model testing the rationality of PAC contributions
paid by the profession to the Senate. The censored model indicates significant parameter
coefficients in the expected direction for the variables related to pro-business ideology,
membership on the Senate Banking committee, election year and election tightness. The
coefficient for Top leadership position is marginally significant given the .104 P-value
can reduce by half. The variable related to membership on related committees was not
significant, nor was its interaction with election year. Similar results were obtained using
alternative models that either substituted an interactive variable for election tightness and
related committee membership or removed any interactive variables.
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Table I-5. Tobit model of PAC Contributions to the U.S. Senate
PAC = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2LEADER + b3RELATED + b4BANK + b5ELECTYR+ b6ELECT+
b7RELATED*ELECTYR
Coefficient
Partial
Expected estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y*)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y)
Mean of X
CONSTANT
+/-28.92
9.09
-3.18 (.002) -15.14***
USCC106
+
11.35
5.32
2.13 (.033)
5.93**
.630
LEADER
+
9.63
5.93
1.63 (.104)
5.04
.045
RELATED
+
0.01
4.82
0.00 (.998)
0.00
.227
BANK
+
6.79
3.19
2.13 (.034)
3.55**
.182
ELECTYR
+
19.81
3.11
6.36 (.000)
10.36***
.375
ELECT
+
33.07
19.29
1.71 (.087)
17.31*
.395
RELATED*ELECTYR
+
2.91
6.79
0.43 (.668)
1.52
.068
Sigma =10.13 (σ=.1.12, SE=9.02, p-value= .0000)
Log Likelihood function -184.06
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
(One-tailed p-values can be used for directional predictions.)
Marginal effects significant (two tailed) ***=.01, **=.05, *=.10

These results provide further support for hypotheses H1a, b and c in that the profession
appears to have a significant bias in their contributions toward congressional members
with pro-business ideologies and those sitting on important committees having
jurisdiction over matters relevant to the economic interests of the profession. The
profession also allocated relatively more resources to incumbent Senators who faced stiff
competition in the previous election cycle and were facing an imminent election in the
current election cycle. These results also support the hypotheses that the accounting
profession is equally concerned with gaining access to members on the powerful Senate
Banking committee and with controlling the composition of the Senate. Regarding the
relative magnitude of the marginal effects, the results indicate that elections are the most
important influence in determining PAC contributions paid by the profession to Senators.
Political ideology and having a top leadership position are also important, followed by
membership on the important Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
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Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between PAC contributions paid by the
accounting profession to congress and roll call voting favorable to the interests of the
profession. In order to test this hypothesis, I specify a probit model that takes into
account the dichotomous nature of roll call votes. The focus is on a transformation of the
probability that the dependent variable equals one. In practical terms, the probit model
should come to the same conclusions as a binary logistic regression model, however,
probit coefficients tend to be smaller and are interpreted differently (Borooah, 2002).
One of the main differences is that probit coefficients represent the marginal effect of a
unit change on the cumulative normal probability (Z-score) of the dependent rather than
the natural log of the odds ratio. Probit also uses an inverse standard normal cumulative
distribution function while logistic regression uses a binomial distribution function.
Chappell (1982) suggests that if campaign contributions are actually endogenous to
voting behavior, as may be the case, the single equation estimation technique is subject to
possible simultaneous equations bias. In such cases, there will be a correlation between
the error terms of the censored PAC contribution model and the probit models and the
coefficients will be biased upwards possibly indicating significance where this is none. If
this is the case, he recommends a simultaneous “probit-tobit” model that uses predicted
values of an interest group’s propensity to contribute from the tobit model to estimate the
probit model of the probability that a legislator will cast a vote in favor of the interest
group. However, Chappell (1982) states that if there is no correlation between the error
terms, the single equation techniques are sufficient to estimate the models. The error
terms from the models in this study are not significantly correlated. Therefore the general
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form of the single equation probit model is:

VOTE = b0 + b1USCC1061i + b2PAC1i

Where VOTE is coded 1 for votes favorable for the profession and 0 for votes
unfavorable to the profession. The independent variables for political ideology and PAC
contributions received remain as described in model 2. A statistically significant positive
coefficient for the variable of interest (PAC) would support the hypothesis that PAC
contributions paid by the accounting industry are associated with roll call voting behavior
favorable to the interests of the profession.
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A summary of the votes taken in the House of Representatives on H.R. 3763 as originally
drafted appears in table I-6.

Table I-6. Major Legislative Actions H.R. 3763
House consideration April 24, 2002
No.
1

Sponsor
Oxley R-OH

2

Capuano D-MA

3

Sherman D-CA

4

Kucinich D-OH

5

LaFalce D-NY

6

LaFalce D-NY

7

Oxley R-OH

Issue
Amendment to strike provisions
requiring senior financial officers
code of ethics
Amendment to require 1 person on
Public Regulatory Organization to be
a non-CPA
Amendment to require net capital of
CPA to equal ½ of audit revenue
Amendment to create Federal Bureau
of Audits to conduct audits
Amendment to establish Public
Regulatory Organization within 90
days of enactment
Motion to recommit with penalties for
CEO/CFOs
Motion to pass H.R. 3763

8

Sarbanes-Oxley

Motion to pass

Pro-CPA
Neutral

Result
Agreed

Tally
Voice vote

Unfavorable

Rejected

Voice vote

Unfavorable

Rejected

Voice Vote

Unfavorable

Rejected
Roll 107
Rejected
Roll 108

39 yeas
381 nays
202 yeas
219 nays

Rejected
Roll 109
Passed
Roll 110

205 yeas
222 nays
334 yeas
90 nays

Unfavorable
Neutral
Favorable

At least three of the roll call votes concerning H.R. 3763 were of particular interest to the
accounting profession. The first vote concerned an amendment, sponsored by Mr.
Kucinich, D-OH, that would have created a Federal Bureau of Audits to audit publicly
traded companies. The economic effect of this amendment would have significantly
reduced audit fee income among the major accounting firms making its passage clearly
unfavorable to the accounting profession as a whole. The second roll call vote concerned
an amendment sponsored by Mr. LaFalce D-NY that would have required the creation of
the Public Regulatory Organization within 90 days of enactment. The creation of a
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Public Regulatory Organization would diminish the autonomy of the accounting
profession in standard setting and thus passage of this amendment would have been
unfavorable to the accounting profession as a whole. The third important roll call vote
concerned the motion to pass H.R. 3763 as written. This would have allowed the SEC to
establish the criteria for a Public Regulatory Organization (PRO) comprised of both
public members and professionals to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures. The bill also prohibited auditors from performing an unspecified list of
consulting activities, to be determined at an unspecified future date. There was also a
provision that authorized the SEC to perform the duties of the PRO if it had failed to
recognize any other PRO within one year of enactment. Thus, without any specific
restrictions or mechanisms to ensure implementation, H.R. 3763 effectively maintained
the status quo while providing a rhetorical display that condemned improper behavior.
Since the effect was purely symbolic, I consider its passage as favorable to the
accounting profession as a whole. I have omitted tables of descriptive statistics for each
of the roll call votes taken in the House because they were almost identical to those
shown in table I-1 for the PAC contribution models. The results of the analysis for each
House vote are shown in tables I-7, I-8 and I-9.

Overall, the model indicates that political ideology was the best predictor of pro-business
roll call voting behavior by members of the House of Representatives. The coefficients
for political ideology (USCC106) are positive and significant in all three votes. This
means that a past record of pro-business voting was the best predictor of voting in
alignment with the interests of the accounting profession. With respect to the effect of
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PAC contributions on roll call voting behavior, results for two of the roll call votes show
positive and significant (α=.10) coefficients. These were the votes on Rep. Oxley’s
motion to pass H.R. 3763 (HV110) as originally drafted and Rep. Kucinich’s amendment
to create a Federal Bureau of Audits (HV107). However, the PAC contribution
coefficient was not significant on HV108, the amendment introduced by Rep. LaFalce DNY that would have required the creation of the Public Regulatory Organization within
90 days of enactment. This result could be due to party loyalty since the vote on HV108
broke much more along party lines than did HV110 and HV107. In all models, the
significant partial derivatives of the expected value of the vote for PAC contributions
were smaller than those for political ideology.

Since the probability of a favorable vote is not a linear function, but a cumulative normal
function of Z, the effect of a unit change in PAC contributions on the probability of a
favorable vote depends on the level of the all the independent variables. Therefore, in
order to interpret the coefficients you can substitute the sample means of the
independents into the probit equation and calculate an estimated Z score for each vote.
The Z score corresponds to the overall probability of a favorable vote found in a standard
normal distribution Z table. This provides the baseline probability of a favorable vote
when all variables are at their sample means. Adding one unit to the mean of the variable
of interest and calculating the change in the overall Z score provides an estimate of the
marginal effect of a unit change in that variable. LIMDEP calculates the marginal effects
for the independents at the means of the independents. These results are shown in the
partial derivative column of the probit model tables. For example, calculating the
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equation for HV110 yields an estimated Z score of approximately 2.83 or a cumulative
probability of over 99%. I interpret this as the probability that a legislator with a USCC
rating of .61 and who had already received $5,200 from the profession would vote in
favor of SOX as originally drafted in the House. The partial derivative for PAC
contributions on HV110 shows that the marginal effect of a one thousand dollar
contribution on the probability of the vote, holding all other variables constant at their
mean, changes the Z score .00073. This indicates less than a .01 percent change in the
probability of the legislator voting for the bill. A quick review of the voting data
indicates that eighty-five members of the House met this criteria and all of them (100%)
voted in favor of the bill. Moreover, this percentage did not change by selecting members
receiving $1,000 more or less than $5,200. In fact, only one legislator out of 198 with a
USCC rating equal to or greater than .61 voted against H.R. 3763 as originally drafted.

The results for HV107, the only other vote with a statistically significant PAC
coefficient, indicate an even smaller marginal effect. I noted statistically significant
marginal effects when testing the responses of non-republicans only. The elasticity for
measures for political ideology and PAC contributions were 1.56 and 0.12 respectively
indicating a slightly larger effect of PAC contributions on non-republican voting behavior
when the average PAC contribution was $3,541 and the USCC voting record was .37.
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Table I-7. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV110
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 110
VOTE = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2PAC1000
Expected
Variable
sign
CONSTANT
+/USCC106
+
PAC1000
+
Republican 213 Aye, 2 Nay
Non-Republican 121 Aye, 88 Nay
Chi Square: 247.65
Log Likelihood function -200.71
Marginal effects not significant.

Coefficient
estimates
-3.00
8.69
0.10

Standard
Error
0.41
1.23
0.31

T-statistic
(p-value)
-7.28 (.000)
7.07 (.002)
3.11 (.001)

Partial
derivatives
-0.23E-1
0.66E-1
0.73E-3

Mean of
X
0.61
5.28

Table I-8. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV107
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 107
VOTE = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2PAC1000
Expected
Variable
sign
CONSTANT
+/USCC106
+
PAC1000
+
Republican 0 Aye, 213 Nay
Non-Republican 39 Aye, 168 Nay
Chi Square:108.19
Log Likelihood function -120.49
Marginal effects not significant

Coefficient
estimates
-1.52
7.17
0.17

Standard
Error
0.47
1.67
0.10

T-statistic
(p-value)
-3.23 (.001)
4.31 (.000)
1.70 (.089)

Partial
derivatives
-0.51E-03
0.24E-02
0.58E-04

Mean of
X
0.61
5.20

Table I-9. Probit Roll Call Voting Model HV108
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 108
VOTE = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2PAC1000
Expected
Variable
sign
CONSTANT
+/USCC106
+
PAC1000
+
Republican 1 Aye, 214 Nay
Non-republican 201 Aye, 5 Nay
Chi Square: 421.90
Log Likelihood function -258.54
*Marginal effects significant at .01

Coefficient
estimates
-6.60
10.29
-0.26E-01

Standard
Error
0.76
1.10
0.02
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T-statistic
(p-value)
-8.74 (.000)
9.32 (.000)
-1.61 (.109)

Partial
derivatives
-2.39*
3.73*
-0.97E-02

Mean of
X
0.61
5.27

In extending the analysis to the Senate, I did not find any significant effect of PAC
contributions on roll call voting behavior related to issues of relevance to the profession.
Of the nine roll call votes, seven were unanimous and only one split roll call vote was
relevant to the accounting profession. Table I-10 shows the significant actions and roll
call votes concerning S.2673.
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Table I-10. Major Legislative Actions S.2673
No.
4174
I,II,III
4175
4176

Sponsor
Leahy D-VT
McConnell RKY
Miller D-GA
Sarbanes D-MD

4184

Gramm R-TX

4185

Leahy D-VT

4186

Biden D-DE

4187

Edwards D-NC

4188
4200

Senate Consideration July 8-15, 2002
Issue
Pro-CPA
Criminal sanctions for destruction
Unfavorable
of evidence or defraud investors
Amend 4174 require audits of
Favorable
labor organizations
Require CEO sign Corp. tax
Neutral
returns
Motion to table 4175
Unfavorable
Amend 4174-I Allow waivers for
NAS restrictions for small
businesses
Criminal sanctions for destruction
of evidence or defraud investors
Increase fraud penalties

Favorable
Unfavorable
Unfavorable

Result
Withdrawn
Tabled
Withdrawn

UA

Agreed
Roll 168
Fell

55 yeas
43 nays

Agreed
Roll 169
Agreed
Roll 170
Agreed
Roll 175
Agreed
Roll 171
Tabled

97 yeas
0 nays
96 yeas
0 nays
97 yeas
0 nays
97 yeas
0 nays
UA
62 yeas
35 nays
UA

Neutral

Lott R-MS

Rules of professional responsibility
for attorneys
Deter fraud and abuse by CEO’s

McConnell RKY
Miller D-GA
Enzi R-WY

Amend 4187 modify attorney
practices toward clients
CEO sign Corp. Tax returns
Motion to table 4200

Neutral

4261

Shelby R-AL

Neutral

4269

Levin D-MI

Unfavorable

Fell

4270

McCain R-AZ

Neutral

Ruled out
of order

4271

Edwards D-NC

Neutral

4272

Levin D-MI

SEC Study on aider and abettor
law
Amend 4187 Banning certain
individuals from public companies
Motion to recommit with
amendment 4270 – expense stock
options
Rules of professional responsibility
for attorneys
Amend 4271 Banning certain
individuals from serving as
directors
Motion for cloture

Agreed
Tabled
Roll 172
Agreed

Fell
w/4270
Fell
w/4271

Modify Amendment No. 4187, to
require disclosure of transactions
involving management and
principal stockholders.
Prohibit personal loans by issuers
to officers
Study Acct for SPE’s
Motion to pass S-O

Neutral

4206

4286

Carnahan

4295

Schumer D-NY

4296

Schumer D-NY
Sarbanes

UA: Unanimous Consent

49

Favorable

Favorable
Neutral

Unfavorable
Neutral

Tally

Agreed
Roll 173
Agreed
Roll 174

91 yeas
2 nays
97 yeas
0 nays

Neutral

Agreed

UA

Neutral
Unfavorable

Agreed
Agreed
Roll 176

UA
76 yeas
0 nays

I applied the probit model to Senate roll call vote SV169 that concerned tabling an
amendment introduced by Mitch McConnell (R-KY) to require audits of labor
organizations. Such an amendment would have been favorable to the economic interests
of the profession and tabling the amendment effectively removed it from consideration.
The results of the probit model on SV168 in table I-11 are similar to the results on
HV108, indicating that political ideology dominated the outcome. The USCC106
variable was positive and significant in the expected direction while the PAC variable
was not significant.

Table I-11. Probit Roll Call Voting Model SV168
U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote 168
VOTE = b0 + b1USCC106 + b2PAC1000
Expected
Variable
sign
CONSTANT
+/USCC106
+
PAC1000
+
Republican 4 Aye 43 Nay
Non-republican 51 Aye 0 Nay
Chi Square: 84.08
Log Likelihood function -59.52
* Marginal effects significant at .01

Coefficient
estimates
-5.30
7.83
-.77E-01

Standard
Error
1.09
1.50
0.22E-01

T-statistic
(p-value)
-4.84 (.000)
5.22 (.000)
-0.35 (.730)

Partial
derivatives
-1.92*
2.83*
-0.28E-02

Mean of
X
.63
6.65

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis supports the hypothesis that interested money is flowing disproportionately
from the accounting profession to pro-business legislators and members of powerful
committees having jurisdiction over matters relevant to economic welfare its members.
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The first model tested the rationality of the profession’s PAC contributions to members
of Congress. The results indicate that accountants give relatively more money to
representatives with pro-business voting records and to incumbents elected by tight
margins. This finding suggests that accountants may be attempting to influence the
ideological composition of the legislature by assisting favored candidates. However, the
analysis on whether the profession is trying to stack the legislature with pro-business
legislators was inconclusive. An OLS model testing the interaction between election
tightness and pro-business voting behavior was significant, but the interaction was not
significant in the censored model. The data also show that controlling for political
ideology, accountants gave significantly more money to incumbent legislators who were
members on the committees having jurisdiction over SOX. This pattern is consistent with
the access hypothesis that predicts special interest groups will target powerful
congressional members, regardless of their political ideology, simply because they are in
a position to influence policy outcomes.

The second model tested the effect of PAC contributions on specific roll call votes that
had a material impact on the accounting profession. The results indicate that the marginal
effect of PAC contributions on specific roll call votes is very small, if it is present at all.
Past pro-business voting behavior is the best predictor of roll call votes relevant to the
profession. Even where PAC contributions have a statistically significant association with
a roll call vote, they do not seem to have any practical significance.

There are several implications to these results. The first implication is that the
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accounting profession is not neutral with respect to policy formulation. The pro-business
bias in PAC contributions suggests that the profession may represent the interests of its
wealthy corporate sponsors over the interests of the broader public. To the extent that
incumbents vote in a manner consistent with the interests of their sponsors, this money
may affect policy outcomes.

A second implication is that to the extent that the profession is successful in influencing
election outcomes, this pro-business bias may skew political representation in the
legislature, marginalizing less wealthy interests and undermining the ideal of
representative democracy. Marginalizing less financially munificent interest groups such
as those concerned with Civil Rights, women’s issues and the environment from the
political process may contribute to a growing disillusionment with the democratic system
among the broader public that in turn, may lead to less participation by the public in the
political process.

The third implication is that the bias in contributions to powerful legislators having direct
authority over important legislation relevant to the economic interests of the profession
suggests that the profession is engaged in a strategy to capture the important regulatory
institutions governing its actions. While theories of economic regulation suggest that the
political system will ultimately achieve equilibrium among competing interest groups,
there is little or no discussion on the effects of short-run disequilibrium or the disutility
suffered by marginalized groups.
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There are also several important limitations of this study. First, the study concentrated
on a single issue and legislative cycle. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to
other time-periods or issues. There was a great deal of public interest in accounting
reform and investor protection following the collapse of Enron and other notable public
companies. There was also a significant amount of public interest in campaign financing
during the 107th Congress. On March 27, 2002, the president signed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act into law. This act banned soft money contributions to political
parties and doubled the previous limits on the amount of hard money that individuals can
contribute. It is unknown whether the enhanced public salience on these issues may have
affected the pattern of PAC contributions during the study period. In addition, much of
the political process is unobservable and hence, excluded from the analysis. The impact
of logrolling, emulation of leaders, private deals and in-kind payments on voting behavior
is unknown, but may be significant. We are also unable to determine the precise timing
of PAC contributions and see whether the profession paid money ex-ante or ex-post with
respect to any specific vote. Ex-ante payments could influence a vote if legislators
interpreted the payments as such and were willing to reciprocate by voting in a direction
that they otherwise would not have. However, ex-ante payments might also galvanize a
legislator’s position against the profession if they see it as a nefarious attempt to
influence their vote. Likewise, ex-post payments could influence a vote if the payments
represent compensation to the legislator for having voted a certain way and the legislator
changed their vote to obtain the compensation. However, if the legislators do not believe
the profession will compensate them regardless of their vote, then any ex-post payment
would be gratuitous and irrelevant to the vote.
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Further analysis is also required to determine if accountants as a group wield an
inordinate amount of political influence relative to other groups, such as labor or specific
industries, such as oil and gas or pharmaceuticals. While the base proposition that PAC
money paid by the accounting profession is biased toward pro-business legislators was
supported in this study, the interests of the profession may at times, conflict with those of
their clients. For example, legislation that increases the compliance burden on industry
favors the economic welfare of the profession, but not their clients. Future research
should also seek answers to the larger question of the profession’s relative political
influence by analyzing the extent of its lobbying activities and the relative influence of
accountants in their role as expert witnesses in congressional testimony.
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II) STUDY TWO – A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF TESTIMONY
RELATED TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

INTRODUCTION

Several recent studies, including part one of this dissertation, have focused on identifying
and assessing the effectiveness of political strategies used by the accounting profession to
influence Federal legislation (Roberts and Bobek, 2004; Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney,
2003). Using Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of political strategies, Roberts, et al
(2003) concluded that accounting firms and professional organizations have generally
adopted a long-term relational approach for influencing the political process that spans
multiple issues and incorporates a variety of strategies and tactics. They found that
accounting firms have participated both individually and collectively through
professional organizations making extensive use of informational and financial incentive
tactics as well as a modest use of constituency building tactics. Roberts, et al (2003)
further tested for the effectiveness of these strategies on roll call voting, and found a
significant positive correlation between political action committee (PAC) contributions
by the accounting profession to committee members and roll call voting behavior
favorable to the interests of the profession. Finally, Roberts et al. (2003) suggested that
these strategies were at least partially successful in weakening the initial version of the
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as proposed by Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH) in the
House.

Part one of this dissertation found that the accounting profession rationally allocated
relatively more PAC contributions to members of committees having direct jurisdiction
over SOX. This finding suggests that these PAC contributions were given in order to
gain access to legislators and lobby them on behalf of the accounting profession. This
reasoning is consistent with economic theories of regulation that predict regulated
industries will attempt to influence or even capture the institutions regulating them for the
economic benefit of their members (Stigler, 1971).

Study one also found that the profession rationally allocated more financial resources to
legislators with pro-business voting records and to legislators engaged in close elections,
suggesting that the accounting profession is trying to influence the ideological
composition of Congress by supporting legislators with pro-business voting records. The
study also tested a roll call voting model on congressional roll call votes related to SOX
and found a significant association between PAC contributions paid by the profession and
roll call voting behavior favorable to the interests of the profession on two out of three
roll call votes in the House of Representatives. However, the marginal effect of the PAC
contributions on voting behavior was small, particularly among legislators with a record
of pro-business voting. These findings indicate that PAC contributions are something
more than symbolic relationship sustaining gifts, but roll call voting models are
extremely limited in the additional information they can uncover.
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The final roll call vote on SOX was unanimous in the Senate and near unanimous in the
House and this invariance prohibits any empirical analysis using traditional linear voting
models. While the invariance in the final vote suggests that legislators across the
political spectrum had achieved consensus on how to reform corporate governance and
audit regulation, a cursory review of the congressional transcripts suggests that legislators
were often in heated disagreement over specific provisions of SOX. The final vote may
have merely represented a buckling of congressional will under enormous public scrutiny
following the Enron and WorldCom collapses. The loss in market value that investors
suffered from these and other frauds during 2001-2002 was unprecedented and enraged
large blocks of powerful constituents who demanded action. As a result, legislators may
have felt compelled to vote in favor of the final bill or risk losing their seat in the next
election.

In December 2001, following the collapse of Enron and with congressional elections less
than a year away, Congress was well motivated to act swiftly and enacted SOX in near
record speed. Less than eight months transpired between the announcement of Enron’s
bankruptcy and signing of the Act. Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Chairman of Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs began the first of ten public hearings
on accounting reform and investor protection on February 12, 2002. Almost
immediately, on February 14, 2002 Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH), Chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee, sponsored H.R. 3763 “The Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002”. The House Financial
59

Services Committee began the first of three related hearings on March 13, 20024. Sen.
Sarbanes subsequently introduced S2673, the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002 on June 25, 2002 were merged during a conference
committee on July 25, 2002 when the House passed HR3763 as amended by the Senate to
incorporate S2673.

This study seeks to expand the study of political influence of the accounting profession in
federal regulation by incorporating a textual analysis of congressional testimony during
the policy formulation period of SOX. The focus of the study is on the political process
as opposed to the outcome. The underlying motivational theory is similar to that of roll
call voting models. I hypothesize a relationship between the level of PAC contributions
donated by an interest group and behavior that is favorable to that interest group. In this
paper, the focus is not on the final roll call vote of SOX, since that was virtually
invariant. Rather the focus is on the discourse during public hearings held by congress
during the policy formulation period of SOX. Fairclough (1989) asserts that politics is
the language, including the disputes occurring in language and over language while
Schaffner (1997) points out that language is fundamental to the process of transforming
political will into social action. Partington (2003) also claims there is a natural link
between institutional analysis and textual analysis because the “discourse is the
institution”. This linkage between politics and discourse leads to the proposition that the
linguistic patterns of committee members in public hearings related to SOX will vary
systematically depending on a vector of independent variables including PAC
contributions paid by the profession. The aim is to provide insight into which legislators
60

were publicly talking about SOX, including how frequently and forcefully they were
speaking, and whether there is any evidence that the accounting profession influenced
their speech. To the extent that speech patterns during congressional testimony can be
associated with specific topics, positions and political ideologies should provide insight
into the reasoning of the legislators and those who support them.

The results of the study indicate that while controlling for political and structural factors,
the propensity of Republican House Financial Services Committee members to speak
during public hearings related to SOX was positively and significantly associated with
the level of PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession. The study also finds
that PAC contributions were positively associated with the frequency of speech among
House Republican committee members concerning specific topics relevant to the
profession, such as consulting services and non-audit services. Finally, the study finds a
positive association between PAC contributions and the frequency that Republican House
committee members used markers of persuasive language. The implication is that PAC
contributions provide evidence consistent with the notion of pay-for-performance
contracts, with legislators providing arguments consistent with the preferences of the
profession. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews
previous textual research in accounting. Section three develops hypotheses regarding the
relationship between PAC contributions and speech performance. Section four describes
the data and methods of analysis. Section five test the hypotheses, and section six
discusses the implications and limitations of the study.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Jones and Shoemaker (1994) provide an overview of content analysis in accounting
research, dichotomizing much of it into two general classes, thematic studies and
syntactic studies. Thematic studies identify themes or content categories within a text and
attempt to draw some conclusions, or inferences regarding the motivations or concerns of
the communicators. Syntactic studies generally focus on the counting of words or
concrete references using some formula, such as the Flesch Index5, to assess the
readability of a text, or Diction6 analysis to evaluate verbal tone. Smith and Taffler
(2000) describe these alternative approaches as form oriented (objective/syntactic) versus
meaning oriented (subjective/thematic). Using discriminant analysis and a concordance
program to construct word and theme variables7 from discretionary disclosures in
Chairman’s statements, Smith and Taffler (2000) found an association between the
frequency of occurrence of certain keywords in the texts and financial distress. Sydserff
and Weetman (2002) used computerized Diction scoring and developed a transitivity
index, measured as the number of passive constructions8 in a text, in analyzing
Chairman’s statements and manager’s reports of good performers versus poor
performers. Since discourse with frequent passive constructions is typically more
abstract, technical and formal in style, it creates the appearance of distance between the
speaker and the message. Sydserff and Weetman (2002) theorized that poor performers
would use more passive constructions that good performers. Their results were mixed,
but provided some evidence that the narratives of poor performers were characterized by

62

a more objective, detached style of writing, indicative of management wanting to distance
itself from the message. Ober, Zhao, Davis and Alexander (1999) also used Diction
software to analyze narratives among Fortune 500 companies and found a higher level of
certainty in recorded oral public communications of Fortune 500 companies versus their
written Management Discussion and Analysis section in 10-K reports. However, no
association between the level of certainty expressed and profitability was found. In
summary, there is little extant theory regarding the role of text in accounting and the
results of prior research are mixed.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Committees offer a rich environment within which to study the dynamics of the
legislative process. Romano (1997) describes the role of congressional committees as the
key formulators of legislation since there is virtually no chance that a measure can pass
without the approval of a committee. All bills are referred to a committee as soon as they
are introduced, and if the governing committee tables a bill, it is unlikely to reach the
floor for a vote. More importantly for the purposes of this study, committees hold public
hearings on proposed legislation, obtain prepared testimony from experts and interested
parties and question witnesses with regard to the particulars of related events.
Ostensibly, the purpose of these hearings is to assist committee members in gathering
information and develop expertise on policy proposals. However, the traditional
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literature tends to discount this informational role of congressional hearings (Romano,
1997). Committee members have many sources of information and they often use
hearings for personal reasons, such as to publicize a partisan agenda or to galvanize
public support on a favored measure (Romano, 1997). To these ends, committee chairs
may ‘stack’ the witness lists with people supportive of their favored positions (Leyden,
1995). Oleszek (1989) also noted that committee members enter hearings not only with
prepared questions, but also with expected answers garnered through extensive staff
interviews and rehearsals with potential witnesses. In a classic case study, Huitt (1954)
found no evidence that hearings changed committee members’ positions. Rather, he
suggested that each group came into the hearings with a ready-made frame of reference
and only used the facts that were compatible with their arguments while discounting or
ignoring others, even when elaborately documented (Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000).
This suggests that the SOX hearings were primarily motivated to galvanize support
behind partisan agendas rather than to gather new relevant information.

Previous research indicates that congressional representatives are purposive actors
(Kathlene, 1994; Hall, 1987; Sinclair, 1999, 1983). Sinclair suggests that political parties
delegate power and resources to leaders to overcome collective action problems and
facilitate the passage of legislation that furthers the interests of the party. To the extent
that leaders are faithful agents of the party, they should respond to changes in their
member’s expectations. This faithful adoption of the party’s agenda may help explain the
intransigent positions observed among committee members during public hearings. Hall
(1987) found that participation of congressional representatives during committee
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hearings was associated with the goals of committee members and their relative
opportunities or constraints to participate. Significant goals of committee members that
were identified included serving their districts, making good policy, making a personal
mark and promoting the president’s agenda. Significant opportunities and constraints on
speaking included leadership position, party affiliation and freshman status. Kathlene
(1994) found that after controlling for political factors and structural features of
committee hearings, that men become more verbally aggressive and controlling of the
hearing as the proportion of women increases in a legislative body. Verbal aggression
was measured by the number of words spoken, number of turns taken and interruptions
made or received. Important political factors and structural features related to
participation in committee hearings that Kathlene (1994) identified included position,
personal interest in the topic and legislative expertise. Personal interest was measured by
the frequency that members mentioned specific topics or bills. Legislative expertise was
measured by the number of terms served in the legislature and position was measured by
whether the speaker held the chair and controlled the agenda and turns at talk.

Previous research has also documented a pro-business and Republican bias in the
accounting professions giving to congress in general. This suggests that the profession is
attempting to control the political ideology of the legislature and contradicts the access
hypothesis that predicts the profession should give to powerful members of relevant
committees regardless of their political ideology in order to gain access and lobby them
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi, 2002). According to this hypothesis, there should
be no difference in giving among committee members based on ideology or political
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party. If this were true, then the profession should have rationally allocated equal
amounts of resources to the Chairmen of the committees having direct jurisdiction over
SOX regardless of their political affiliation since they control the agenda, topics and the
turns at talk. However, this was not the case for SOX. The relatively pro-business
republican, Rep. Oxley, who was the Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, received a total of $43,500, making him the largest recipient of PAC
contributions from the accounting profession during the 107th Congress. On the other
hand, the relatively pro-social Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) who was Chairman of the
powerful Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs received nothing
from the profession.

An alternative to the access/ideology theories suggests that PAC contributions represent
pay-for-performance contracts where recipients reciprocate by casting votes or altering
other behavior to further the agenda of the contributor. If this were true, it would be
rational for the profession to give relatively more to the Republican or pro-business
committee members who support the profession’s agenda since their behavior could
influence the outcome of the policy formulation process. According to this reasoning,
Republican committee members receiving PAC contributions from the accounting
profession should reciprocate by advancing the profession’s interests during public
debate, and be more inclined to act in the professions interests. However, it is also
possible the profession would be motivated to pay members of the opposition in order to
encourage them to remain silent or soften their arguments against the profession’s agenda
during the policy formulation period. For example, if a pro-business Democratic
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committee member feels constrained by party affiliation from arguing forcefully in favor
of a pro-business legislative alternative, the next best option would be to tone down the
force of their party’s arguments or to remain silent on the matter. This line of reasoning
leads to the proposition that PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession should
be positively associated with Republican speech during committee hearings regarding
SOX and negatively associated with Non-republican speech, or more formally:

H1a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively associated with speech
performance among Republican committee members during committee hearings related
to SOX.
H1b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively associated with speech
performance among Non-republican committee members during committee hearings
related to SOX.

In addition, not all topics under discussion during the SOX committee hearings were
equally relevant to the accounting profession. SOX had significant provisions affecting
the issuers, boards of directors, corporate officers and audit committees. With respect to
the provisions affecting audit firms, the text of the hearings indicates that the profession
was particularly concerned with the potential prohibition against providing consulting
services to a firm’s audit clients. Partners of the major firms and former regulators
provided extensive and compelling arguments on why these services do not compromise
auditor independence. However, legislators ultimately included a bright-line list of
services into SOX that audit firms cannot provide their clients.
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Another issue was the mandatory rotation of audit firms among publicly traded
companies. Again, a significant amount of controversy surrounded this topic, and the
final bill ultimately included a compromise wherein audit partners in the same firm are
required to rotate primary engagement responsibility every five years. Other issues of
concern to the profession included, but were not limited to auditor independence, audit
fees, and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that
effectively stripped the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants of its ability to
set auditing standards for publicly held entities. These items were contentious issues
among legislators during the policy formulation period of SOX and the subject of much
debate during the House and Senate committee hearings. To the extent that PAC
contributions encouraged Republican committee members to argue in favor of the
interests of the profession, there should be a positive association between PAC
contributions and the frequency Republicans discussed these topics. Alternatively, to the
extent that PAC contributions encourage members of the opposition to remain silent or
soften their arguments against the profession, there should be a negative association
between contributions and speech. Hence the second set of hypotheses are:

H2a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively related to the frequency
of speech on topics relevant to the profession among Republicans committee members.
H2b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively related to the
frequency of speech on topics relevant to the profession among Non-republican
committee members.
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Finally, it would be rational for the profession to give more to committee members who
are relatively more persuasive. This leads to a hypothesis that PAC contributions will be
positively associated with the persuasiveness of political discourse. Again, the direction
of the effect of PAC contributions should differ depending upon the issue and party
affiliation. Therefore, with respect to SOX, the third set of hypotheses are:

H3a: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be positively associated with
linguistic markers of persuasion among Republican committee members.
H3b: Accounting profession PAC contributions will be negatively associated with
linguistic markers of persuasion among Non-republican committee members.

The measurements for these markers are discussed in the data analysis section.

DATA AND METHOD

The analysis is restricted to the prepared readouts and spontaneous speeches of members
on the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Development during hearings related to formulating policy on SOX.
The data consist of the transcripts of a series of congressional committee hearings related
to SOX where people from a variety of affected interest groups, including the accounting
profession, testified. These transcripts are publicly available and provide an easily
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accessible source of data concerning the most salient and relevant arguments given both
in support of, and in opposition to key provision of SOX9. The Government Printing
Office identifies thirteen hearings specifically related to SOX and publishes them in four
volumes under the title Accounting Reform and Investor Protection. These include the
transcripts of ten hearings held by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs between February 12 and March 21, 2002 and three hearings of the House
Committee on Financial Services.

The participants consisted of committee members appointed from within the ranks of the
governing parties and witnesses representing the most prestigious accounting,
investment, and banking firms as well as past and present leaders of relevant regulatory
agencies and standard setting bodies. In general, the format of the hearings consists of
opening (prepared) statements by each of the committee members and witnesses followed
by a question and answer period. Occasionally, the participants submit written questions
and responses following the hearing. The text of the SOX hearings consist of about equal
amounts of prepared statements of opinion and question and answer periods between two
equally professional sides. An important feature of this context however, is the position
of the Chairman and his ability to regulate topics and turns at talk. The majority party in
the House and Senate appoint the Chairmen of their respective committees. During the
107th Congress, the Republicans had gained control of the House and appointed Rep.
Oxley to chair the House Financial Services Committee (House committee). The
Democrats gained control of the Senate after Sen. James Jeffords (I-VT) left the
Republican party to become an Independent and appointed Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes (D70

MD) to chair the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Senate
committee).

The first of the Senate hearings began February 12, 2002 with the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee10 chaired by Sen. Sarbanes. Rep. Oxley, chair of
the House Financial Services Committee subsequently sponsored H.R. 3763 “The
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of 2002”
on February 14, 2002 and held the first House hearings on March 13, 2002.

Content analysis was conducted using the software, QSR N6 (QSR International, 2002)
and Concordance 3.0 (Watt, 2002). QSR N6 enables the dissection of congressional
hearings into coded nodes. These nodes can be free (standalone) topics or embedded in
tree banks. QSR N6 also provides routines to search text among nodes and export
frequency counts to SPSS for further analysis. A concordance program can search a text
or set of texts for a string of letters (keyword or phrase) and list all occurrences along
with a certain amount of co-text for each one. These lists enable an analysis of the
patterns in the co-text surrounding words providing information regarding their use.
These lists can be sorted in a variety of ways such as alphabetically by headword, by
frequency of occurrence, or according to co-occurring words (context) preceding it or
following it. The concordances reported in this analysis were prepared using
Concordance 3.0 (Watt, 2002).
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DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics for the House and Senate samples are shown in tables II-1 and II-2.
The House Financial Services Committee consisted of seventy members. In general, the
descriptive statistics indicate members of both the House and Senate committees were
predominately pro-business11 incumbent males who had received PAC contributions
from the profession. As noted above, Republicans controlled the House committee and
Democrats controlled the Senate committee. Total turns at talk and text units spoken
were considerably higher among the Senate committee members. This is because there
were ten days of Senate hearings and only three days of hearings in the House. There are
also fewer committee members in the Senate committee. A majority of the House
committee members did not speak at all during the hearings while virtually all members
of the Senate committee spoke. In the House sample, the profession gave significantly
more to previously incumbent and Republican committee members. Independent T tests
indicate that previously incumbent Senators also received more from the profession than
freshmen, however Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate non-normal distributions for all
variables in the Senate sample with the exception of Seniority and the nonparametric
Mann-Whitney ranked sum and Wilcoxon signed rank tests were not significant.
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Table II-1. Descriptive Statistics House Financial Services Committee
House Financial Services Committee
Male
Female
Total

57
13
70

Received PAC
No PAC
Total

63
7
70

Freshman
Re-elected
Total

10
60
70

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Total

38
31
1
70

USCC106> 50%
USCC106<50%
No USCC
Total

40
20
10
70

Speaker
Did not speak
Total

30
40
70

Variable
PAC money (thousands)
Turns at talk
Text units (sentences)
Seniority

N
70
70
70
70

Mean
12.50
7.09
45.49
8.54

Std. Dev.
10.98
16.24
111.04
6.19

Minimum
0
0
0
2

Maximum
43.50
100.00
714.00
28.00

PAC contributions
Indicator variables
Chairman position
(CHAIR)
Freshman Status
(FRESH)
Gender (GENDER)

Variable Description

Group

N

Mean
PAC
43.50
12.10
11.21***
20.61***
12.82
11.36
16.05***
8.40***

Std. Dev.

1 if the legislator holds the
committee chair, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a freshman
legislator, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a Male, 0
if female.
1 if Republican, o otherwise

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

CHAIR

FRESH

GENDE

PARTY

PAC

-.049
.057
.110
.342**

-.015
.129
.302*

.152
.052

.350**

-

Member of the
Republican party
(PARTY)
Correlation matrix
TURNS TEXT SENIOR
TURNS
TEXTUNITS .963**
SENIORITY .411**
.441** .358**
.456** .224
CHAIR†
FRESH†
-.020
-.047
-.434**
-.009
.033
.090
GENDER†
REPPART†Y -.064
-.084
.053
PAC1000
.153
.180
-.211
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed)
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed)
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed)
†Dichotomous variable
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1
69
10
60
57
13
38
32

10.39
10.99
10.47
11.08
10.86
10.44
10.28

Table II-2. Descriptive Statistics Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban
Affairs
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs
Male
Female
Total

20
1
21

Received PAC
No PAC
Total

14
7
21

Freshman
Re-elected
Total

5
16
21

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Total

10
10
1
21

USCC106> 50%
USCC106<50%
No USCC
Total

9
7
5
21

Speaker
Did not speak
Total

19
2
21

Mean
8.2237
45.76
302.43
8

Std. Dev.
12.08
92.31
547.65
6.96

Variable
PAC money (thousands)
Turns at talk
Text units (sentences)
Seniority

N
21
21
21
21

Minimum
0
0
0
2

Maximum
35.56
425
2,534
26

PAC contributions
Indicator variables
Chairman position
(CHAIR)
Freshman Status
(FRESH)
Gender (GENDER)

Variable Description

Group

N

1 if the legislator holds the committee
chair, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a freshman
legislator, 0 otherwise.
1 if the legislator is a Male, 0 if female.

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

1
20
5
16
20
1
10
11

Member of the
1 if Republican, o otherwise
Republican party
(PARTY)
Correlation matrix
TURNS TEXT
SENIOR CHAIR
TURNS
TEXTUNITS .990**
SENIORITY
.673**‡ .707**‡ CHAIR†
.941**‡ .934**‡ .593**‡ -.054
-.103
-.494*
-.125
FRESH†
.052
.040
.198
.050
GENDER†
REPPARTY† -.257
-.226
.000
-.213
PAC1000
-.165
-.113
-.012
-.156
* - Significant at the .10 level (Two-tailed)
** - Significant at the .05 level (Two-tailed)
*** - Significant at the .01 level (Two-tailed)
†Dichotomous variable
‡ Not significant using nonparametric tests
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Mean
PAC
0
8.63
3.00*‡
9.86*‡
8.18
9.00
12.11
4.69

Std.
Dev.
12.24
3.67
13.38
12.39
14.93
7.90

FRESH

GENDE

PARTY

PAC

-.400
-.309
-.248

.213
-.015

.315

-

Hypotheses 1a and 1b test whether the profession discriminated in giving to members of
committees having direct jurisdiction over SOX on the basis of party affiliation and
speech performance. To the extent that speech represents the reciprocal behavior that
committee members exhibit in pay-for-performance contracts with their contributors,
PAC contributions given by the profession should encourage the relatively pro-business
Republican committee members to speak and advance the profession’s agenda during the
hearings. PAC contributions given to the opposition party should have the opposite
effect. That is, PAC contributions paid to the opposition represent hush money and Nonrepublican committee members should reciprocate by remaining silent or softening their
arguments. Therefore, PAC contributions should be positively associated with speech
performance among Republicans and negatively associated with speech performance
among Non-republicans.

Preliminary analysis using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shown in table II-3
provides some support for H1a. The profession allocated relatively more resources to
speaking Republicans in the House than to non-speaking Republicans and all Nonrepublicans regardless of whether they spoke or not. However, there was no significant
difference between Non-republicans on the basis of their speech performance, and H1b is
not supported. There was also no statistical difference in giving among speakers of either
party in the Senate.
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Table II-3. One-Way ANOVA House Financial Services Committee
PAC Contributions
Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Non-speaking Non-Republican
14
10.471
11.91
0
30.92
Speaking Non-Republican
18
6.7813
8.82
0
26.33
Non-speaking Republican
26
13.011
8.32
0
27.32
11.84
4.5
43.50
Speaking Republican
12
22.6323
Superscripts indicate group membership (1,2,3)
Difference between Group 1 and 2 significant at the .05 level equal variances assumed
Difference between Group 3 significant at the .05 level unequal variances assumed

Table II-4. One-Way ANOVA Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs
Variable
N
Non-speaking Non-Republican
Speaking Non-Republican
11
Non-speaking Republican
2
Speaking Republican
8
No statistical differences between groups.

Mean
4.69
0.50
15.02

Std. Dev.
7.90
0.71
12.08

PAC Contributions
Minimum
Maximum
0
27.05
0
1.00
0
35.56

A more rigorous test of H1a and H1b was conducted using a tobit model with the number
of sentences spoken during the hearings (TEXTUNIT) as the dependent variable and
PAC contributions as the test variable. Additional independent variables were selected
based on previous research (Kathlene, 1994; Hall, 1987; Sinclair, 1983). These control
variables include the party controlling the chair (REPPARTY), the position of the chair
(CHAIR), freshman status (FRESH), legislative expertise (SENIORITY) and gender
(MALE). A positive relationship between PAC contributions and amount of speech
would support the pay-for-performance contracting theory. It is necessary to control for
party affiliation because rules for committee hearings grant each committee member
equal amounts of time to speak or interrogate witnesses. Since Republicans outnumbered
Non-republicans on the committee, Republican members may have had relatively more
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time to speak than Non-republicans. On the other hand, assuming the political ideologies
of the parties differ and the introduced legislation reflects the controlling party’s agenda,
the opposition may have a higher propensity to argue for changes to legislation that are
more consistent with their party’s values. With respect to SENIORITY, congressional
members with more seniority in office should be more likely to speak since they are
comfortable with the setting and less tenured members might defer relatively more of
their speech time to senior party members. The CHAIR position controls the agenda,
directs the turns at talk, and naturally has more opportunity to speak. The text units and
turns at talk of the chair position were adjusted to eliminate instances of turn transition
talk such as “Thank you very much.” Control variables for freshman status and gender
are also included based on the prior work of Hall (1987) and Kathlene (1994). Hall
(1987) detected less participation among freshman legislators (FRESH), including the
frequency of their speech. Kathlene (1994) did not find any significant association among
committee members between frequency of speech and Freshman status, but did find a
negative association between frequency of speech and female gender (GENDER). I have
included all of these variables in the general form of the model shown below.

TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER +
b5REPPARTY + b6PAC1000

Where:
TEXTUNITS = The number of sentences spoken during hearings.
SENIORITY = The number of years the committee member has served in Congress.
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CHAIR

= Indicator variable for the legislator holding the committee chair position.

FRESH

= Indicator variable for freshman status, 1 = Freshman, 0 otherwise.

GENDER

= Indicator variable for Gender, 1 = male, 0 for female.

REPPARTY = An indicator variable for political party affiliation. 1= Republican
otherwise 0.
PAC1000

= Political Action Committee contributions received from the accounting

profession, scaled per $1,000 increments.

The results from the House in table II-5 indicate that committee members’ overall
propensity to speak during the hearings was positively associated with the chair position,
PAC contributions and seniority, and negatively associated with the Republican Party.
The results from the Senate indicate significant positive associations between speech
performance and the chair position, seniority and freshman status. No significant
association was found between speech performance and PAC contributions in the Senate
sample.
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Table II-5. Tobit model of Text units for U.S. House of Representatives
House Financial Services Committee
TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5REPPARTY +
b6PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-109.03
59.51
-1.83 (.067)
-41.87*
SENIORITY
+
13.82
3.83
3.61 (.000)
5.31**
8.54
CHAIR
+
317.19
169.10
1.88 (.061)
121.84*
0.01
FRESH
111.13
68.06
1.63 (.103)
42.69*
0.14
GENDER
+
-58.23
50.04
-1.16 (.245)
-22.37
0.81
REPPARTY
+
-138.01
48.35
-2.85 (.004)
-53.01**
0.54
PAC1000
+
4.01
2.31
1.74 (.082)
1.54*
12.55
N=70
Sigma = 144.18 σ= 20.03 SE= 7.20 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -211.85
Conditional Mean at sample point: 38.75
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.38
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
Marginal effects *=significant at the .10 level two-tailed **=significant at the .05 level two-tailed

Table II-6. Tobit model of Text units for Senate Committee on Banking Housing and
Urban Affairs
Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs
TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5REPPARTY +
b6PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y)
Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-74.54
197.72
-0.38 (.706)
-72.47
SENIORITY
+
27.20
7.21
3.77 (.000)
26.45**
8.00
CHAIR
+
1883.26
206.00
9.14 (.000)
1831.03**
0.04
FRESH
195.17
108.25
1.80 (.071)
189.75*
0.24
GENDER
+
17.97
175.44
0.10 (.918)
17.47
0.95
REPPARTY
+
-64.48
77.87
0.83 (.408)
-62.69
0.48
PAC1000
+
3.44
3.14
1.10 (.273)
3.34
8.22
N=21
Sigma = 153.48 σ= 25.43 SE= 6.03 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -124.57
Conditional Mean at sample point: 295.57
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.97
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
Marginal effects *=significant at the .10 level two-tailed **=significant at the .05 level two-tailed
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The negative association between political party and speech was somewhat unexpected
given that the Republicans controlled the committee chair and outnumbered their Nonrepublican counterparts. Committee rules allow equal time to each committee member
for interrogating witnesses. One possible explanation might be that the Republicans
stacked the witness list with pro-business experts and allowed them to speak longer
uninterrupted during their allotted interrogation time. The Non-republican committee
members may have chosen to utilize more of their allotted time for personal expression
rather than letting the witness respond. This is somewhat supported by additional
unreported regression results from the House indicating that Non-republican committee
members asked significantly more narrow WH questions (Who, what, where, when) and
polar yes/no questions than the Republicans. The narrow and polar yes/no questions do
not allow a responding witness to elaborate as much, or for as long, as would occur if he
or she is being asked broad how or why questions. The strategic use of these types of
questions may have allowed the Non-republicans to utilize relatively more of their
allotted time to express their party’s viewpoint as opposed to letting a Republican
selected witness express theirs. In these regressions among the speakers in the Senate,
Seniority was positive and significantly associated with all question types.

In order to test the directional robustness of the PAC1000 variable, additional models
were run on each respective party. A positive coefficient for PAC1000 was expected for
the Republican sample and a negative coefficient was expected for the Non-republican
sample. In partial support of H1a, the House results shown in table II-7 show a
significant positive relationship between PAC contributions and speech among
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republicans. Seniority remained statistically significant, but the association between
speech and the chair position was not statistically significant among Republicans only.
The results for the House Non-republicans were also not statistically significant and do
not support H1b. The results in the Senate again indicated that seniority was the only
significant predictor of speech performance.

Table II-7. Tobit model of Text units for U.S. House of Representatives Republicans
House Financial Services Committee
Republicans Only
TE TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-283.07
125.70
-2.25 (.024)
-84.19**
SENIORITY
+
10.78
5.17
2.09 (.037)
3.21**
8.84
CHAIR
+
218.88
179.97
1.22 (.224)
65.10
0.03
FRESH
75.89
78.30
0.97 (.333)
22.57
0.18
GENDER
+
-16.39
65.08
-0.25 (.801)
-4.87
0.87
PAC1000
+
7.54
3.83
1.97 (.049)
2.24**
16.05
N=38
Sigma = 115.16 σ= 26.17 SE= 4.40 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -84.04
Conditional Mean at sample point: 21.67
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.30
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
** Marginal effects significant at the .05 level two-tailed
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Table II-8. Tobit model of Text units for Senate Committee on Banking Housing and
Urban Affairs Republicans

Variable

Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs
Republicans Only
TEXTUNITS = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2FRESH + b3PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y)

CONSTANT
+/-97.98
114.79
SENIORITY
+
25.80
10.56
FRESH
-836.33
48101.18
PAC1000
+
4.43
3.59
N=10
Sigma = 152.11 σ= 38.86 SE= 3.92 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -52.53
Conditional Mean at sample point: 107.84
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.70
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.

-0.85 (.393)
2.44 (.015)
-0.02 (.986)
1.24 (.217)

Mean of
X

-68.30
17.99
-583.01
3.09

8.00
0.10
12.11

Secondary analysis using one-way ANOVA shown in table II-9 on the House indicates
that more PAC contributions were given to silent pro-business Non-republicans than to
silent pro-business Republicans and speaking pro-business Non-republicans. Probusiness status was determined by the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC)
rating of the legislator’s voting record. Legislators with USCC ratings in excess of 50%
were considered pro-business. These results indicate that the association between PAC
contributions and Non-republican speech may be dependent on their having a probusiness ideology. That is, only some of the pro-business Non-republican members
reciprocated by remaining silent in response to the PAC contributions.

Additional results in the House sample show that, speaking or not, freshmen Republicans
were paid significantly more than freshman Non-republicans. Amounts given to liberal
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and unrated (freshmen) Non-republican committee members were significantly lower
than the amounts given to all pro-business committee members and the unrated
(freshmen) Republicans. This suggests among the House Financial Services Committee,
the profession has an initial bias in giving toward Republican freshmen versus Nonrepublican freshmen, but will give more to Non-republicans members as they
demonstrate pro-business voting behavior. Again, there were no significant differences
between groups in the Senate.

Table II-9. One-Way ANOVA House Financial Services Committee
Variable

N

Mean PAC
Contributions
4.041
4.501
8.271
12.1112
12.1412
18.64123
19.62123
24.2523
30.603

Std. Dev.

PAC Contributions
Minimum
Maximum

Liberal Dem/Ind Not Speaking
8
5.68
0.00
Liberal Dem/Ind Speaking
12
7.93
0.00
Freshman Dem/Ind Speaking or Not
3
6.19
2.50
10.31
1.00
Pro-business Dem/Ind Speaking
5
8.22
0.00
Pro-business Rep Not Speaking
23
Pro-business Rep Speaking
8
12.53
4.50
6.77
14.56
Freshman Rep Not Speaking
3
12.19
6.00
Pro-Business Dem Not Speaking
4
Freshman Rep Speaking
4
4.51
26.50
Superscripts indicate group membership (1,2,3)
Means of groups 1,2 and 3 differ at the .05 level of significance (equal variances assumed)
No significant differences detected assuming unequal variances.

17.29
26.33
14.81
25.50
24.00
43.50
27.32
30.92
37.00

Overall, the results suggest there was a positive association between PAC contributions
and speech among Republican committee members in the House. This provides some
support for H1a. However, except for the final ANOVA test in table II-9, the association
between PAC contributions among Non-republicans was not significant in either the
House or the Senate committee hearings. Therefore, the majority of the evidence does
not support H1b.
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The second set of hypotheses predict that Republican recipients of PAC contributions are
positively associated with the frequency that certain topics are mentioned and negatively
associated with the frequency that Non-republicans mention them.
To test this, I selected several relevant topics and tested for differences in the frequencies
that each party mention them. The topics and relative frequencies are shown in table II10. Tobit models were then run using the topic frequencies as the dependent variable and
independent variables from the general model. Independent T-tests indicate that as a
group, Non-republicans mentioned Consulting or Non-audit services and Rotation
significantly more frequently than Republicans. These issues were particularly salient to
the profession since prohibition of consulting services and mandatory rotation of audit
firms would have a significant impact on firm specific revenue.

Table II-10. Accounting Related Topics - House Financial Services Committee
House Financial Services Committee
Frequency of Topic by Party
Republican
Non-republican
* Significant at .10
**Significant at .05

Indepen~
20
17

Consult~
Nonaudit
4**
11**
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Rotat~
7*
26*

Fees
8
11

Oversight
1
25

Table II-11. Frequency of Consulting as a Topic - House Sample
House Financial Services Committee
CONSULTING = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5REPPARTY +
b6PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-5.77
2.04
-2.83 (.005)
-0.81**
SENIORITY
+
0.31
0.10
3.17 (.002)
0.04**
8.54
CHAIR
+
-2.37
3.36
-0.71 (.481)
-0.33
0.01
FRESH
1.68
1.72
0.98 (.329)
0.24
0.14
GENDER
+
0.39
1.31
0.30 (.763)
0.06
0.81
REPPARTY
+
-4.12
1.35
-3.04 (.002)
-0.58**
0.54
PAC1000
+
0.16
0.59
2.67 (.008)
0.02**
12.55
N=70
Sigma = 2.71 σ= 0.59 SE= 4.60 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -4918
Conditional Mean at sample point: 0.19
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.14
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
** Marginal effects significant at the .05 level two-tailed
House Financial Services Committee
Republican Only
CONSULTING = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5REPPARTY +
b6PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/-13.37
5.93
-2.25 (.024)
-0.01
SENIORITY
+
0.42
0.17
2.49 (.013)
0.00
8.84
CHAIR
+
-9.36
4.68
-2.00 (.046)
-0.00
0.03
FRESH
1.20
1.52
0.79 (.432)
0.00
0.18
GENDER
+
0.90
1.27
0.71 (.479)
0.00
0.87
PAC1000
+
0.33
0.15
2.23 (.026)
0.00
16.04
N=38
Sigma = 2.71 σ= 0.59 SE= 4.60 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -4918
Conditional Mean at sample point: 0.19
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0.14
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
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The results of the analysis indicate that while controlling for political and structural
factors, PAC contributions were positively associated with the frequency that House
committee members mentioned Consulting or non-audit issues. Tobit was unable to
estimate the model for rotation issues among the House committee members. The results
also indicate that Republican members mentioned consulting significantly less than Nonrepublican members. When the model was applied to the Republican members only,
PAC contributions, seniority and the Chair were positive and significantly associated
with the frequency that consulting was mentioned.

Table II-12. Consulting Frequencies – Senate Sample
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
CONSULTING = b0 + b1SENIORITY + b2CHAIR + b3FRESH + b4GENDER + b5REPPARTY +
b6PAC1000
Coefficient
Partial
Expected
estimates
Standard
T-statistic
derivative
Variable
sign
E(Y)
Error
(p-value)
of E(Y) Mean of
X
CONSTANT
+/6.33
6.86
0.92 (.356)
2.74
SENIORITY
+
0.14
0.26
0.56 (.574)
0.06
8.00
CHAIR
+
25.65
6.79
3.78 (.000)
11.11**
0.05
FRESH
-1.15
4.29
-0.27 (.788)
-0.50
0.24
GENDER
+
-8.81
6.01
-1.47 (.142)
-3.82
0.95
REPPARTY
+
-0.92
3.07
-0.30 (.690)
-0.40
0.48
PAC1000
+
-0.05
0.13
-0.40 (.690)
-0.02
8.22
N=21
Sigma = 4.76 σ= 1.49 SE= 3.20 p-value= .000
Log Likelihood function -27.50
Conditional Mean at sample point: 1.53
Scale factor for marginal effects: 0..43
Two tailed p-values are reported for all variables.
**significant at the .05 level two-tailed

Results from the Senate sample shown in table II-12 only indicated a positive and
significant association between CHAIR and CONSULTING. That is, Chairman
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Sarbanes who received nothing from the accounting profession spoke about consulting
and non-audit services more frequently than other Senate committee members.

These results are consistent with the results on H1a and H1b. The implication of these
results suggest that in the House, Republican recipients of PAC contributions from the
profession reciprocated by discussing issues of relevance to the profession relatively
more frequently than non-recipients. These results provide some evidence that House
committee members reciprocated in pay-for-performance contracts with PAC
contributors by discussing issues relevant to the profession.

LINGUISTIC VARIABLES

The third set of hypotheses predict that the relative frequency of persuasive markers will
be positively associated with PAC contributions in Republican speech and negatively
associated with Non-republican speech. In order to measure the persuasiveness of
language, I draw on empirical work in computerized corpus linguistics and construct
linguistic variables related to the persuasiveness and force of speech.

According to Zadeh (1975), linguistic variables are arrived at through fuzzy logic, or
approximate reasoning. This is a mode of reasoning that is “not exact, or very inexact, but
offers a means to approximate the characterization of phenomena that are too complex or
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ill-defined to be amenable to description with conventional quantitative terms” (Zadeh,
1975; p. 199). Simply put, linguistic variables are variables whose values are words or
sentences in either a natural or artificial language. Zadeh (1975) describes them as a
quintuple consisting of 1) the name of the variable, 2) the term set, or collection of its
linguistic values, 3) a universe of discourse (i.e. language), 4) a syntactic rule that
generates the terms in the term set, and 5) a semantic rule that associates each linguistic
value with its meaning. Linguistic fuzziness can be illustrated using the term ‘height’.
Height is a term consisting of a term set. A person’s height can be described as short or
tall in varying degrees, i.e. quite short, very short, or extremely short. The term set may
be infinite, i.e. very, very, very… short. A person can also be both short and tall,
depending on the perspective of the observer. Shortness can also refer to a degree of
length, i.e. short or long, or to something ‘less than needed’, i.e. short on cash, short of
the runway. So what does a statement like “Bill is short” mean? Fuzzy logic would apply
a syntactic rule that says Bill is human, and human shortness usually refers to height,
when not accompanied by an argument, such as ‘on cash’. The semantic rule associated
with this version of short usually means shorter than most, but taller than some. However,
the definition of short is contingent, and the logic used to arrive at its meaning in context
is fuzzy, not crisp. More importantly, with respect to construct validity and linguistic
variables, to the extent that the definition of a concept is contingent, so is its
measurement. This problem is particularly acute with respect to some of the linguistic
concepts used in prior research, such as transitivity or certainty. These concepts are
global properties with multiple, normatively defined facets. For example, transitivity
consists of at least ten components12 that represent the degree to which an activity is
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‘carried over,’ or transferred from an agent to a patient13 in a sentence (Hopper &
Thompson, 1980). Likewise, Diction’s master variable for certainty consists of nine
components14 based on the work of general semanticists, such as Alfred Korzybski, S.I
Hayakawa and Wendell Johnson, in the 1940’s (Hart and Childers, 2004; Hart, 2001).
While their definitions have a certain amount of face validity, it is unclear how to
measure them and empirically establish their convergent and discriminant validity.

In order to address this issue I draw on empirical research conducted in computerized
corpus linguistics. Corpus linguistics generally refers to how features of spoken
discourse, including rhetorical strategies, can be analyzed with the aid of corpora
(collections of recorded utterances used as a basis for the descriptive analysis of a
language). McEnery and Wilson (1996) define a corpus as “a body of text which is
carefully sampled to be maximally representative of a language or language variety” (pp.
87). Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998) describe them as large, principled collections of
naturally occurring text, and suggests their usefulness in analyzing large amounts of
language collected from many speakers in order to draw empirically supported general
conclusions regarding grammatical patterns. The importance of corpora in linguistic
analysis has been discussed at length (Biber, et al, 1998, Biber, 1988; Partington, 2003,
1998; Kennedy, 1998; McEnery and Wilson, 1996), and generally, their value is
perceived to be directly related to the degree that they represent the characteristics of the
genre of language under study. Traditionally, corpus linguistics has concerned itself with
lexicography, grammatical description and register studies, and not pragmatics15 or
discourse analysis16. The principle reason given for this lacuna in the literature is that
89

pragmatics and discourse analysis tend to rely on context, and corpora strip most of the
context away (Partington, 2003; Biber, et al., 1998; McEnery and Wilson, 1996).
Another reason given is that, until recently, there has been a paucity of complete corpora
with which to conduct discourse analysis.

PERSUASIVE MARKERS

Research in corpus linguistics has revealed that linguistic features vary systematically
depending on the specific speech situation in which they occur and the functions they are
intended to serve. This is because people have mental frames or scripts gained from
previous experience of what will happen in certain speech settings and adjust their
expectations of their own and other’s behavior according to the context. A review of this
research also suggests that the co-occurrence of certain linguistic features can indicate the
force of the claims made, and whether they are offered as subordinated positions, or as
recommended courses of action. In a seminal study, Biber (1988) found that linguistic
structure in text varies depending on the nature of the speech17 situation and the intended
function of the communication. In a factor analysis of twenty-three linguistic genres18 in
two major corpora19, Biber (1988) found at least five dimensions of variation. These
were labeled 1) involved versus information production, 2) narrative versus non-narrative
discourse, 3) elaborated versus situated dependent reference, 4) overt expression of
persuasion and 5) impersonal versus non-impersonal style (Biber, et al, 1998). It should
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be noted that Biber (1988) found no clear distinction between spoken and written English
per se. Rather, he found the variation within each mode of communication was often as
great as the variation between them. More importantly for the purposes of this study,
Biber (1988) found a set of features labeled Overt Expression of Persuasion. These
features include prediction and possibility modals, suasive verbs, necessity modals,
conditional subordination, infinitives and split auxiliaries. Prediction modals (will,
would, shall) and their contractions are used to refer to the future and are direct
pronouncements that certain events will or will not occur. Possibility modals (can, may,
might, could) are statements concerning the ability or possibility of certain events
occurring, and are used to consider different perspectives on a problem. When used with
a first person agent, prediction and possibility modals indicate intention, e.g. I (we) will
support, I might support. In other cases, they can offer an assessment of likelihood, e.g.
they will support, they might support. Necessity modals and suasive verbs mark the
author or speaker’s attempts to persuade the addressee that certain events are desirable.
Necessity modals (ought, should, must) are pronouncements concerning the obligation or
necessity of certain events while suasive verbs20 (e.g. demand, insist, propose) imply
intention to bring about certain events in the future. Conditional subordinators (if,
unless) specify the conditions that are required for certain events to occur. Infinitives (to
plus the root of a verb) are commonly used as adjective and verb compliments. In these
constructions the head adjective or verb encodes the speakers attitude or stance toward
the proposition encoded in the infinitival clause, e.g. happy to do it, hoped to see it. Split
auxiliaries occur when adverbs are placed in between an auxiliary and its main verb, e.g.
to boldly go, to blindly follow. However, Biber (1988) noted that the co-occurrence of
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split auxiliaries with these other features may be due to the fact that the auxiliaries are
frequently modals rather than split auxiliaries being overt markers of persuasion. Texts
with a high incidence of persuasive markers included professional letters, institutional
letters and letters to the editor while broadcasts and press reviews contained notably few
of them. Prepared and spontaneous speeches, official documents and academic prose
were also relatively unmarked with respect to these features when compared to other
texts.

Another set of surface features not strictly associated with Biber’s (1988) dimension of
overt argumentation yet of interest to this analysis include downtoners, hedges, amplifiers
and emphatics. Downtoners (almost, barely, hardly) have a general lowering effect on
the force of the verb. Biber (1988) notes that while downtoners can mark uncertainty
towards a proposition they may also mark politeness or deference toward an addressee.
Hedges (maybe, sort of, kind of ) are less specific markers of probability. Whereas
downtoners give some indication of the level of uncertainty hedges simply mark a
proposition as uncertain. Amplifiers (absolutely, completely, extremely) boost the effect
of a verb and can be used to indicate certainty or conviction towards a proposition, as
well as signal solidarity with the listener. The relation between emphatics (very, really,
just, most, more) and amplifiers is similar to that between hedges and downtoners, in that
emphatics simply mark the presence of certainty while amplifiers indicate the degree of
certainty toward a proposition. Illustrations of the use of these markers in discourse
analysis are presented in Appendix II-2. I draw on this literature in the following analysis
to identify salient words and term sets and to examine the frequency that legislators use
92

them in context of public debate. The variables and related term sets used in this analysis
are identified in Table II-13.

Table II-13. Linguistic Variables
Variable
Necessity modals
Amplifiers
Emphatics
Predictive modals
Suasive verbs

Possibility modals
Downtoners
Hedges

Term Set
[Must|Ought|Should]
[Absolutely|Altogether|Completely|Enormously|Entirely
|ExtremelyFully|Greatly|Highly|Perfectly|Strongly
|Thoroughly|Totally|Very]
[A lot|Do|For sure|Just|More|Most|Real|Really|So|Such a]
[Shall|Will|Would|Won’t]
[Agree|Allow|Arrange|Ask|Beg|Command|Concede|Decide
|Decree|Demand|Desire|Determine|Enjoin|Ensure|Entreat|Grant
|Insist|Instruct|Intend|Move|Ordain|Order|Pledge|Pray|Prefer
|Pronounce|Propose|Recommend|Request|Require|Resolve|Rule
|Stipulate|Suggest|Urge|Vote]
[Can|Could|May|Might]
[Almost|Barely|Hardley|Merely|Nearly|Only|Partially|Partly
|Practically|Slightly|Somewhat]
[Almost|At about|Kind of|Maybe|More or less
|Something like|Sort of]

Source: Biber (1988)

All frequencies are first normalized to a text length of 1,000 sentences so that the
frequency values for different speakers are comparable. Thus if necessity modals are
spoken 220 times over 3,217 sentences, then the normalized frequency of occurrence
would be 68 times per 1,000 sentences. The normalization process allows the frequencies
of occurrence for each speaker to be directly comparable to one another. The normalized
frequencies can then be standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Thus, if the normalized mean of necessity modals was 68 with a standard deviation of 65
and speaker A used this feature 17 times over 56 sentences, then they would have a
standardized score of 3.62 [17/56*1000)=3.62*65+68] on this feature. The standard
score of 3.62 indicates that speaker A used necessity modals very frequently in discourse
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relative to other speakers at the hearings. The normalized frequencies and Z scores for the
linguistic variables in the House and Senate samples are shown in tables II-14 and II-15.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that there will be a positive association between PAC
contributions and markers of persuasive speech among Republicans, and a negative
association among Non-republicans. The results of independent T-tests on the House
sample indicate that, on average, Non-republicans used persuasive markers more
frequently in their speech than Republicans. Significant differences existed on all
linguistic variables in the House sample with the exception of suasive verbs and
predictive modals. The results among Senate committee members was the opposite. In
the Senate sample, the only linguistic variable with a significantly different frequencies
of usage between Republicans and Non-republicans was for suasive verbs. Nonrepublicans Senate committee members used significantly more suasive verbs than
Republicans. These results may be due to differences in the controlling party, and/or to
contextual differences between the House and Senate speech settings.

The results of the multivariate GLM model shown at the bottom of Table II-13 provide
partial support for H3a indicating a positive and significant association between the usage
of persuasive markers and PAC contributions among Republican committee members in
the House. Consistent with previous results, there was no significant association among
House Non-republicans. There were no also no significant associations detected in the
Senate sample, therefore, hypothesis H3b is not supported.
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Table II-14. Frequencies of Linguistic Variables – House Financial Services Committee
House Financial Services Committee
Normalized Frequencies of Selected Linguistic Variables*
Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Necessity modals
70
23.70
50.55
0
303.57
Amplifiers
70
17.73
38.53
0
250.00
Emphatics
70
50.49
80.08
0
343.75
Predictive modals
70
50.07
74.10
0
270.27
Suasive verbs
70
15.67
29.04
0
135.14
Possibility modals
70
59.11
89.72
0
371.79
Downtoners
70
6.65
19.60
0
125.00
Hedges
70
10.75
21.71
0
100.00
*Normalized to text length of 1000 sentences
Standardized Scores of Selected Linguistic Variables
Z-Variables
N Party
Mean
Std. Dev.
Std. Error
P-value
Necessity modals
32 Non-republican
0.23
1.24
0.22
.096*
38 Republican
-0.19
0.70
0.11
Amplifiers
32 Non-republican
0.28
1.34
0.24
.050*
38 Republican
-0.23
0.48
0.08
Emphatics
32 Non-republican
0.33
1.61
0.21
.014*
38 Republican
-0.28
0.75
0.12
Predictive modals
32 Non-republican
0.16
1.02
0.18
.210
38 Republican
-0.14
0.97
0.16
Suasive verbs
32 Non-republican
-0.04
0.83
0.15
.760
38 Republican
0.03
1.13
0.18
Possibility modals
32 Non-republican
0.26
1.07
0.19
.051*
38 Republican
-0.22
0.90
0.15
Downtoners
32 Non-republican
0.27
1.38
0.24
.060*
38 Republican
-0.22
0.40
0.07
Hedges
32 Non-republican
0.23
1.20
0.21
.083*
38 Republican
-0.20
0.76
0.12
*Significant at .10 (Two tailed)
House Financial Services Committee
Multivariate General Linear Model
Republicans Only
ZVARi-j = b0 + b1PAC1000 i-j
Expected
Nec.
Amp.
Emph
Pred
Sua
Poss
Down
Hedge
Variable
sign
CONSTANT
+/-0.218
-0.520
-0.712
-0.570
-0.161
-0.702
-0.179
-0.501
P-value
(.313)
(.000)
(.002)
(.052)
(.641)
(.009)
(.152)
(.031)
PAC1000
+
0.002
0.018*
0.027*
0.027*
0.012
0.030*
0.003
0.019
P-value
(.888)
(.015)
(.020)
(.079)
(.505)
(.030)
(.665)
(.115)
Adj. R2
.129
.118
.058
.099
.042
Wilks’ Lambda significant for constant and PAC1000 at .05

95

Table II-15. Frequencies of Linguistic Variables – Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Development
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development
Normalized Frequencies of Selected Linguistic Variables*
Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Necessity modals
21
44.82
42.88
0
176.47
Amplifiers
21
51.85
36.18
0
117.65
Emphatics
21
95.62
61.82
0
193.33
Predictive modals
21
102.02
50.96
0
184.47
Suasive verbs
21
17.84
19.81
0
78.13
Possibility modals
21
87.84
45.43
0
170.73
Downtoners
21
8.89
10.40
0
40.00
Hedges
21
15.97
13.66
0
38.46
*Normalized to text length of 1000 sentences
Standardized Scores of Selected Linguistic Variables
Z-Variables
N Party
Mean
Std. Dev.
Std. Error
P-value
Necessity modals
11 Non-republican
0.11
0.77
0.23
.621
10 Republican
-0.12
1.23
0.39
Amplifiers
11 Non-republican
0.11
0.93
0.28
.594
10 Republican
-0.13
1.11
0.35
Emphatics
11 Non-republican
0.24
0.89
0.27
.254
10 Republican
-0.27
1.09
0.35
Predictive modals
11 Non-republican
0.30
0.66
0.20
.175
10 Republican
-0.33
1.23
0.39
Suasive verbs
11 Non-republican
0.49
1.12
0.34
.013*
10 Republican
-0.54
0.44
0.14
Possibility modals
11 Non-republican
0.22
0.64
0.19
.310
10 Republican
-0.24
1.29
0.41
Downtoners
11 Non-republican
0.30
1.13
0.34
.152
10 Republican
-0.33
0.76
0.24
Hedges
11 Non-republican
0.28
1.07
0.32
.190
10 Republican
-0.30
0.86
0.27
*Significant at .10 (Two tailed)
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study tested three sets of complimentary hypotheses regarding the association
between PAC contributions given by the accounting profession and speech performance
among members of congressional committees having jurisdiction over SOX. The
hypotheses suggest that PAC contributions represent pay-for-performance contracts and
that legislators reciprocated by altering their speech performance during public hearings
related to SOX. Specifically, the hypotheses suggest that Republican committee
members receiving PAC contributions reciprocated by increasing their rhetoric in support
of the profession’s agenda. In addition the hypotheses predicted that Non-republican
members receiving PAC contributions from the profession reciprocated by remaining
silent or decreasing the quantity or quality of their rhetoric against the profession’s
agenda. A significant association between PAC contributions and committee member’s
speech performance during public debate concerning policy formulation would be
consistent with a theory of political influence exerted by the accounting profession.

The results among the House Financial Services Committee indicate positive and
significant associations between PAC contributions paid by the accounting profession
and Republican speech performance. The first indication is that the profession paid
Republican speakers significantly more than non-speaking Republicans and all Non-
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Republicans. In addition, the number of text units (sentences) spoken by House
Republican committee members was also positive and significantly associated with PAC
contributions paid by the profession. The frequency that House Republicans mentioned
consulting and non-audit services was also positive and significantly associated with
PAC contributions. Finally, there was a positive association between PAC contributions
and markers of persuasive speech among House Republican committee members.

The implication of these findings is that House Republicans tend to reciprocate with their
PAC contributors by engaging in debate during committee hearings, speaking more when
they do engage in debate, discussing topics relevant to their contributors more frequently
and using relatively more markers of persuasion in their speech. The results on House
Non-republican committee members and members of the Senate committee do not
support a theory of pay-for-performance contracting.

There are numerous limitation on the results of this study. First, the text samples analyzed
were limited to the members of the House Financial Services Committee during three
days of public hearings and ten days of hearing in the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Development concerning SOX. Consequently, the results cannot be
generalized to other committees, time-periods or topics. Second, the theory put forth in
this study should be critically evaluated. Extant theory on the speech behavior of
legislative committees is scant and needs further development. Finally, to the extent that
this theory is incomplete or incorrect directly affects the specification of the empirical
models used in this study and the validity of their results.
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APPENDIX II-1

An illustration of how some of these features are associated with persuasive argument is
shown in the following modal analysis of ranking minority member Rep. John LaFalce’s
(D-NY) opening statement before the House Committee on Financial Services on March
13, 2002. This analysis is conducted with the aid of a concordance program. A
concordance program identifies and retrieves all instances of a word or a string of words
in a text along with the surrounding context. Concordancing for all instances of the
necessity and possibility modals ‘can’ ‘may’ might’ ‘should’ and ‘must’ in the text helps
to construct the minority argument that the SEC budget should be tripled (see text lines
T2, T6) since boards of directors were too passive (T3) in responding to earnings
manipulation by management (T4-5). Lafalce also uses two necessity modals to demand
meaningful oversight of the audit profession (T8) and to reform of the functioning of
audit committees (T9).
T1) We have to sort through them and try to come to some consensus. I hope we can do that.
T2) Second, and this is something that I think we can now agree on, and I will finish up, I called
for the 200 to 300 percent increase in the SEC budget.
T3) Very often, unchecked by the board of directors for one reason or another, because of a policy
passivity that may have existed at too many boards, because of the same stock options to a
lesser extent to be sure that corporate officers, their chief desire is not a better product or a
better service, but market capitalization, to drive capitalization.
T4) The SEC, as you know, was tripling the number of mandated restatements, which was at least
some indication that something might well be wrong.
T5) And there was too much of an incentive it seemed to me within corporate America,
particularly because of the compensation mechanisms that have evolved over the years, for
earnings manipulation, for revenue recognition when it should not be recognized, for channel
stuffing, cookie jar reserves, and so forth, and so forth.
T6) Now nobody was paying attention in this committee when we were considering the SEC fee
reduction bill, I said what we should be considering in the first instance is not a 2 or 3 percent
increase in the SEC budget, but a 200 or 300 percent increase in the SEC budget, because of
what is going on.
T7) We should at least consider these particular proposals.
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T8) We must also provide for meaningful oversight of the audit profession.
T9) We must reform the functioning of audit committees and the boards of directors of public
companies to ensure that independent directors are truly independent and that auditors are
working for the shareholders, not for the management.

Using the same method, we can see the president and CEO of the AICPA, Barry
Melancon, respond to Lafalce’s attack on the profession cautioning against a rush to
legislation (T1), and making the point that financial statements are created by the
company (i.e. management’s representations) (T2). The preferred solution (i.e. reforming
the functioning of audit committees) is emphasized in T3-4 continuing Melancon’s
theme that management is responsible for financial statement disclosure. Curiously, the
only instances of ‘must’ occur in reference to countries that tried and discarded
mandatory auditor rotation (T6) (ostensibly because it was a bad idea), and in a vague
demand to ‘modernize business reporting’ (T7).
T1) But we all should be wary of proposals that can lead to unintended consequences.
T2) We should all recognize that the financial reporting process is a complex system of checks
and balances that begins with the creation of the financial statement by the company.
T3) To enhance this first step in the process, the audit committee should also have the sole
authority to approve the company's financial statements and require business disclosures in the
annual report and other public documents.
T4) And the audit committee should be responsible for the hiring and firing of the company's
auditor.
T5) Equally important, it should be composed of outside directors with auditing, accounting, or
financial experience.
T6) Finally, I must mention that at one time Canada, Greece, Spain, and Italy all required
mandatory audit firm rotation in one form or another. Three of those four countries
subsequently dropped the requirement.
T7) Efforts to modernize business reporting must be accelerated.

As these examples show, concordancing for modals can be a very useful linguistic
analysis tool for discourse analysis. An analysis of the frequency of use of amplifiers,
emphatics, downtoners and hedges respect to specific topics by specific speakers can also
provide an indication of the level of force associated with an argument. For example, the
following passages selected from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
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Affairs hearing on March 14, 2002 indicate the AICPA was very concerned with who
would serve on any independent oversight board.
We believe that there should be very careful consideration as to how members of the public body
would be nominated and in terms of their terms and the background of the people that would serve
on such an important body. (Mr. Castellano, Chairman AICPA, 3/14/02).
I hope we would look to some of the improvements made in the corporate governance structure
and apply some of those very same safeguards and checks and balances to a body such as this. I
think it is very important, and Mr. Castellano's point about the nominating process is extremely
important. (Ms. Kirtley, Former Chairman AICPA, 3/14/02).

Likewise Senator Gramm, demonstrating solidarity with the profession, hedges on the
idea of non-accountants sitting on the board.
I guess my own views are that if you are going to have an ethics subpanel, that perhaps there is
some logic to having maybe even a majority of people who are non-CPA's. (Senator Gramm,
3/14/02).

This qualified conciliation however, sets the stage for a counter-proposal that a
supermajority should be required for the board to initiate any action.
When we are setting accounting standards, I have to admit that it frightens me to have
nonaccountants in the majority in setting such standards. And when we are setting those standards,
maybe we ought to require a super-majority of the panel, no matter how it is made up. (Senator
Gramm, 3/14/02)

In this statement Sen. Gramm conflates accounting standards with ethical standards in
order to warrant his claim that the ethics subpanel should contain a majority of
accountants. The only obvious support for this claim is his fear of non-accountants.
It is also important to note that these markers can be used simultaneously with
countervailing effects. For example, the witness in the passage below employs an
amplifier (absolutely) in an attempt to agree with Chairman Sarbanes, but subordinates
the clause (to the extent, then) to a possibility modal (may) blunting the message of
solidarity.
To the extent that any of our consulting services may put us in the position of management, then
I absolutely believe there is a conflict and I believe that is for listed or nonlisted companies. (Mr.
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Balhoff, Chairman AICPA Public Company Practice Section, 3/14/02).

These examples indicate how modals, downtoners, hedges, amplifiers and emphatics can
be used to regulate the force of claims made with respect to specific topics.
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Endnotes

1

www.crp.org

2

This includes contributions from individuals ($6,903,477), PACs ($5,788,177) and soft money

contributions ($2,662,402)
3

This includes all lobbying expenditures for calendar years 1999 and 2000.

4 A bill is the most common form of congressional action. A bill originating in the House of
Representatives is designated H.R. followed by a number that it retains throughout all of its parliamentary
stages. Bills originating in the Senate are designated S followed by a number. The Speaker then refers the
bill to the appropriate committee having jurisdiction over the area affected by the measure. Committee
action is a very important phase of the legislative process since it is where the most intense consideration is
given to a measure and when various people are given the opportunity to be heard. Usually, the first step of
a committee is the process of holding a public hearing where committee members hear from witnesses
representing various viewpoints on the measure. Transcripts of the testimony taken at the hearing are
publicly available in the committee office. After the hearings are completed, the bill is considered in a
‘mark-up’ session. The ‘mark-up’ session is where committee members study the various viewpoints in
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detail and offer amendments for acceptance or rejection. This process can take place at either the subcommittee level or the full committee level. At the end of discussion the committee members vote on the
action to be taken with respect to the bill. A bill can be ‘reported’ with or without amendment or ‘tabled’
with no further action taken. After a bill has been reported, the Committee writes a report describing the
purpose and scope of the measure and why it recommends approval. The bill is then considered by the full
House under a ‘rule’ that sets out the particulars of debate, such as the time allowed for discussion and
whether or not amendments can be offered. After all debate is concluded and amendments agreed upon the
House may then vote to ‘recommit’ the bill to committee or vote on final passage. Efforts to recommit a
bill are usually made by opponents attempting to get the bill tabled. After a bill passes the House it goes to
the Senate for consideration. A bill must pass both the House and the Senate before it can be presented to
the President for signature into law. If the Senate changes the language of the bill, it must go back to the
House for concurrence or additional changes. Often a conference committee with both House and Senate
members is established to handle this ‘back and forth’ negotiation and to resolve differences. Conference
committees also issue reports outlining the final version of the bill. Once a bill has passed in both the
House and Senate it is considered ‘enrolled’ and sent to the President who can sign the measure into law,
veto it and return it to Congress, let it become law without signature, or ‘pocket veto’ it at the end of the
legislative session.
5
Both the Flesch index and the Flesch-Kincaid index use a combination of sentence length and syllable
count to measure the difficulty of a text. The Flesch test is expressed as 206.935-((Lx1.015)+(Sx0.846))
where L is mean sentence length and S is the number of syllables per 100 words. The lower the score the
more difficult the passage. See Jones and Shoemaker (1994).
6
DICTION text analysis software was developed by Dr. Roderick P. Hart and is available through Sage
Publications at www.scolari.com. Diction 5.0 uses dictionaries (word-lists) to search a text along five
dimensions labeled: Certainty, Activity, Optimism, Commonality and Realism. Certainty refers to the level
of resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness in a text and the tendency to speak ex-cathedra. Activity
refers to language featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia.
Optimism refers to language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive
entailments. Commonality refers to language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting
idiosyncratic modes of engagement. Realism refers to language describing tangible, immediate,
recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives.
7
Word variables were constructed as the number of common occurrences for each keyword and composites
divided by the total number of words in the narrative. Theme variables were constructed as the sum of
frequencies of keyword combinations occurring in sentences divided by the total number of sentences in
the statement.
8
Passive constructions are created by having the subject acted upon rather than performing the action
expressed by the verb. For example, “The boy hit the ball.” Is constructed using the active voice whereas,
“The ball was hit (by the boy.)” is constructed using the passive voice. In agentless passive constructions,
the agent, (the boy), is omitted and inferred by the reader in context. Agentless passive constructions are
associated with lower transitivity. See Footnote 9 for a more complete description of transitivity.
9
Full transcripts of committee hearings including witness lists, prepared statements and additional material
supplied for the record are available from through the government printing office access website at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov
10
See “Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,
107th Congress, Second Session, Volume I on the Legislative History of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002:
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection issues raised by Enron and other public companies” available
at the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO access DocID: f:87708v1.wais
11
Committee members were dichotomized into those with U.S. Chamber of Commerce ratings above 50%
and those with ratings below 50%. Committee members with USCC ratings above 50% are considered
pro-business while those with ratings lower than 50% are considered pro-social.
12
The ten components described by Hopper and Thompson (1980) in explaining the notion of transitivity
include: “A) Participants - No transfer can take place unless at least two participants are involved. B)
Kinesis – Actions can be transferred from one participant to another; states cannot. Thus something
happens to Sally in I hugged Sally, but not in I like Sally. C) Aspect – An action viewed from its endpoint,
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i.e. a telic action, is more effectively transferred to a patient than one not provided with such an endpoint.
In the telic sentence I ate it up, the activity is viewed as completed, and the transferal is carried out in its
entirety; but in the atelic I am eating it, the transferal is only partially carried out. D) Punctuality – Actions
carried out with no obvious transitional phase between inception and completion have a more marked effect
on their patients than actions that are inherently on-going. Contrast Kick (punctual) with Carry (nonpunctual). E) Volitionality - The effect on the patient is typically more apparent when the A is presented
as acting purposefully; Contrast I wrote your name (volitional) with I forgot your name (non-volitional). F)
Affirmation – this is the affirmative/negative parameter. G) Mode – This refers to the distinction between
‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ encoding of events. An action which either did not occur, or which is presented as
occurring in a non-real (contingent) world, is obviously less effective than one whose occurrence is actually
asserted as corresponding directly with a real event. H) Agency – It is obvious that participants high in
Agency can affect a transfer of an action in a way that those low in Agency cannot. Thus, the normal
interpretation of George startled me is that of a perceptible event with perceptible consequences; but that of
The picture startled me could be completely a matter of an internal state…I) Affectedness of O – the degree
to which an action is transferred to a patient…it is done more effectively in I drank up the milk than in I
drank some of the milk…J) Individuation –refers to the distinctness of the patient from the A, and to its
distinctness from its own background” (pp. 252). Referents of nouns with the following properties are
more individuated/non individuated: 1) proper vs. common, 2) human, animate vs. inanimate, 3) concrete
vs. abstract, 4) singular vs. plural, 5) count vs. mass, 6) referential, definite vs. non-referential.
(Timberlake, 1975).
13
The term patient refers to the receiver of an action in a cardinal transitive relationship. ‘A’ (for agent)
and ‘O’ (for object) refer to the two participants in a two-participant clause. See Dixon (1979).
14
In Diction analysis, the master variable for certainty is composed of the sum of variables representing
tenacity, leveling, collectives and insistence, less the sum of variables representing numerical terms,
ambivalence, self-reference and variety (Hart, 2004). “Additive variables: Tenacity: All uses of the verb “to
be” (is, am, will, shall ), three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all
associated contractions (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t). These verbs connote confidence and totality. Leveling:Words
used to ignore individual differences and build a sense of completeness and assurance. Included are
totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably,
consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut). Collectives:
Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease specificity. These words reflect a dependence
on categorical modes of thought. Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups
(army, congress, legislature, staff ), and geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, republic).
Insistence: This is a measure of code restriction and semantic “contentedness.” The assumption is that
repetition of key terms indicates a preference for a limited, ordered world. In calculating this measure, all
words occurring three or more times that function as nouns or noun-derived adjectives are identified and
the following calculation performed: (number of eligible words ¥ sum of their occurrences) Subtractive
variables:Numerical terms: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given case. This dictionary
treats each isolated integer as a single “word” and each separate group of integers as a single word. In
addition, the dictionary contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, zero) as well as
terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, multiply, percentage) and quantitative topics
(digitize, tally, mathematics). The presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper-specify a claim, thus
detracting from its universality. Ambivalence: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a
speaker’s inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being made. Included are hedges
(allegedly, perhaps, might), and statements of inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and
confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate). Also included are words of restrained possibility (could, would, he’d
) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, seems). Self-reference: All first-person references, including I, I’d,
I’ll, I’m, I’ve, me, mine, my, and myself. Self-references are treated as acts of “indexing” whereby the locus
of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world at large (thereby implicitly acknowledging
the speaker’s limited vision). Variety: This measure conforms to Wendell Johnson’s (1946) type-token
ratio, which divides the number of different words in a passage by the passage’s total words. A high score
indicates a speaker’s avoidance of overstatement and a preference for precise, molecular statements.” (Hart
2004, p519-520)
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15

Pragmatics has been defined as ‘meaning in context’ (Partington, 2003).
There appears to be some confusion regarding the term ‘discourse’. Partington (2003) has used it to
include “any stretch of language in its authentic context” (p.262), while others (Kennedy, 1998) use it to
refer only to language in its spoken form.
17
Although speech refers to strictly to the expression of thoughts or exchange of ideas using spoken words,
I will use the term speech and speaker interchangeably with message and addressor.
18
The written genres included press reportage, editorials, press reviews, religion, skills and hobbies,
popular lore, biographies, official documents, academic prose, general fiction, mystery fiction, science
fiction, adventure fiction, romantic fiction, humor, and personal and professional letters. The spoken
genres included face-to-face conversation, telephone conversation, public conversations, debates and
interviews, broadcast, spontaneous speeches and planned speeches.
19
The two corpora used in Biber (1988) included the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) Corpus of British
English and the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English. Biber (1988) also added a collection of personal
and professional letters since the standard corpora do not include non-published written texts.
20
Biber (1988) used the list of suasive verbs found in Quirk, Randolph; Greenbaum, Sidney; Leech,
Geoffrey; and Svartvik, Jan (1985) A Comprehensive Grammar of The English Language, Longman.
London. Another source for these words is “English verb classes and alternations: A preliminary
investigation.” by Beth Levin. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
16
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III)

STUDY THREE: ACCOUNTING FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST

INTRODUCTION

According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of
Professional Conduct, members should “act in a way that will serve the public interest”
defined as “the collective well-being of the community of people and institutions the
profession serves”. Specifically, the code defines the accounting profession’s public as
“clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and financial
community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified public
accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce1 ”. In this paper I suggest
that by failing to explicitly identify with specific interests and by including anyone who
relies on the orderly functioning of commerce within its public, the profession has tacitly
promised to act as the ultimate social mediator. This is a role it cannot possibly fulfill
given the inevitable and often intractable conflicts among interests and the bounded
nature of human intellect and ability. As a consequence, the image of the accounting
profession has suffered.

109

One of the hallmarks of a profession is its stated responsibility to serve the public interest
(Kultgen 1988). The public interest model of the professions depicts this commitment as
one that obligates professionals to place the goal of service to society ahead of selfinterest considerations. According to this model, a fiduciary responsibility is imposed on
professionals to act competently and altruistically on behalf of the public because their
services are both indispensable and difficult for laypersons to evaluate. This goal of
selfless service is further portrayed as an appropriate offering by a professional group in
exchange for the monopoly of service and self-regulation that the state grants to licensed
professions. Without this commitment to the public good, providers of expert services
could use their informational and market advantages to extract monopoly rents from users
of their services.

Conflict models of the professions, on the other hand, question the face value of public
interest commitments offered by professions (Kultgen 1988; Roberts and Dwyer 1998).
Although declarations of this public interest commitment are proclaimed in codes of
ethics and policy statements of professions, conflict models argue that powerful private
interests are driving the rhetoric used in communications to regulators, legislators and the
public (Canning and O’Dwyer 2003; Roberts and Dwyer 1998; Willmott 1986).
According to this view, the professional ideals of altruism, meritocracy and collegiality
are not portrayed as truly representing reality. Conflict models depict professional
institutions as seeking to perpetuate a mystique surrounding their work product in order
to hinder critical evaluation of their services and insulate their members from outside
interference. This mystification and insulation enables professions to claim expert status
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and the right to self-regulation, thus maintaining a position of dominance whereby they
can exploit the very public they claim to serve.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the public interest ideal as
promulgated by the public accounting profession in the United States (hereinafter the
Profession) and explore what motivates the profession to invoke public interest
arguments in various contexts. In so doing, I also explore the elasticity and ambivalence
of the term public interest while arguing that it is in and of itself part of the mystification
process used by the profession to maintain its self-regulatory status.

I approach my analysis from three different perspectives. The first perspective analyzes
the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric. I define
rhetoric in the traditional Aristotelian sense, i.e. as persuasive appeals based on logic,
emotion and/or authority while assuming a functionalist perspective consistent with the
public interest model of the professions. I illustrate how the profession uses the rhetoric
of the public interest as a measure of proper comportment for its members, to reassure
regulators and the investing public of the benevolent motivations of the profession, and to
maintain the stability of global capital markets.

The second approach adopts a critical perspective. This view eschews any altruistic
motivations on behalf of the profession and casts the language of the public interest as
propaganda intended to support the economic objectives of professional elites in a highly
concentrated monopolistic industry and those of their corporate clients. Using examples,
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I illustrate the instrumental use of the public interest ideal by the accounting profession to
defend its self-regulatory status in times of crisis, as justification to extend its
jurisdictional claims and to minimize its exposure to liability from audit failures.

The final perspective focuses on the ambivalence of language and attempts to reveal how
the true nature of the public interest is ‘undecidable’. This perspective deconstructs the
public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of elements including cultural
values, political doctrine and contingent interests. I use the term myth as both allegory
and parable. Myths are similar to allegory in the in the sense that they exist as symbolic
representations for meanings other than those indicated on the surface. They are also
similar to parables, being fictitious stories illustrating historically embedded moral
attitudes. I rely on myths as the symbolic representations of an ideal reality to describe
the simultaneous and contradictory attitudes present in the public interest ideal and the
inherent instability between what is written and what is read, or what is spoken and what
is heard. A deconstructive reading of the public interest ideal reveals how its central
meaning is always on the move, uniquely reified by readers in context and how any fixed
meaning cannot be sustained. I believe that this paper advances prior critical work
because I focus on the instrumental use of the public interest ideal as a rhetorical strategy
while acknowledging and addressing the differences in meaning attached to the use of
this ideal both by members of the profession as well as external groups.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS RHETORIC

“By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it.” Adam Smith – Wealth of Nations, Chapter 2

Rhetoric has been defined as the management of symbols in order to coordinate social
action (Cooper, 1989). This definition implies that a message has been constructed to
achieve a purposive result. It follows then that a rhetorical analysis requires an
examination of the symbols used with the principal objective of uncovering the message
and original intent of the message maker. According to Aristotle (Trans. 1954), rhetoric,
or persuasive appeals, can be logical (logos), emotional (pathos), and/or ethical (ethos).
Logical arguments appeal to the reasoning and intellect of an audience while emotional
arguments are usually characterized by vivid and emotionally loaded language. Logical
arguments seek a cognitive and rational response from the audience while emotional
arguments seek to reshape the state of mind of the audience to order to obtain the most
productive reception of a message. Ethos, on the other hand refers to the character or
qualifications of the speaker. Appeals based on ethos generally attempt to persuade an
audience by projecting the author’s authority, reliability and competence.

From an ethos perspective there is a long established authoritative basis for linking the
concept of financial reporting with the public interest. The Securities Act of 1934
invokes the ‘public interest’ no less than 14 times in section 13 alone concerning the
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production of periodic reports. Section 2 concerning the necessity for such regulation
firmly states that “…transactions in securities [ ] are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such
transactions and practices…” Since that time, professional and political discourse
concerning accounting has promulgated and reified the term ‘public interest’ into a
condensation symbol representing the standard of goodness by which all political and
professional acts can be measured (Sarat, 2002). As such, it also represents an emotional
appeal, condensing into a single term all socially held beliefs regarding how governments
and professions should act, especially given their appropriation of self-regulatory power.
Authoritative and emotional appeals to “serve the public interest” motivate auditors to act
independently and also notify the investing public of the benevolent purpose and
intention of the profession. Actions seen ‘in the public interest’ are perceived of as
‘good’ and therefore deserving of approval, so it is not surprising that the accounting
profession has appropriated and cloaked itself in the rhetoric of the ‘public interest’,
applying the term liberally in its public communications.

These public interest claims can also be argued on the basis of logic. Logical appeals are
normally conveyed as deductive syllogisms or enthymemes. A syllogism consists of at
least three parts: a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion. They are usually
deductive in the sense that they move from general ideas to increasingly more specific
conclusions. The major premise is usually a universal observation that an audience can
generally accept as true. The minor premise then recasts one object from the major
premise and narrows the subject of the argument. Finally, a conclusion is drawn
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regarding the subject by showing it to be a subset of the universal premise. For example,
most Americans would accept the premise that economic activity is good for society as a
whole. Consequently, a speaker who successfully argues that capital markets aid in
economic growth can logically claim that capital markets are good for society. Likewise,
to the extent that a speaker can convince the audience that auditors are necessary for the
proper functioning of capital markets, they should also be successful in claiming that
auditors themselves are good for society. As long as the foundational premises are true,
then valid conclusions can logically follow.

Enthymemes, on the other hand, are simply syllogisms with omitted premises. For
example, a speaker can simply state that ‘auditors serve the public interest’ based on the
commonly held warrants that: 1) everything good for society is in the public interest, 2)
proper functioning capital markets are good for society, and 3) competent and
independent auditors are necessary for the proper functioning of capital markets. Each of
the supporting sub-claims represent claims in their own right. Each is warranted by their
own data, beliefs or authority and so on, in an ever-extending logical chain of reasoning.
For example, the claim that auditors serve the public interest might also be supported by
the arguments that 1) Professional auditors assist capital markets by ensuring the
production of unbiased and accurate information to be used by managers, investors and
creditors in making rational economic decisions regarding the allocation of capital and
resources; 2) Proper functioning capital markets decrease transaction costs and therefore
the cost of capital to marginal investment increasing aggregate economic output and
utility by expanding the production possibility frontier providing more goods to a given
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population, and 3) Given the result that efficient markets ensure optimal allocation of
resources and maximum aggregate utility, auditors are fulfilling a critical role necessary
for a successful society. Such a rational and coherent argument is difficult to refute,
especially when respected experts have quantified it and supported it with empirical
evidence gathered under rigorous scientific conditions.

The public interest ideal of the accounting profession can also be diagrammed using
Toulmin’s (1969) model of argument. The basic model consists of three principal
components and three sub-components. The three main components of the model consist
of a claim, or assertion that an advocate wants the audience to accept followed by data
provided in support of the claim and warrants, or the assumptions necessary to bridge
between the data and the claim. The three sub-components consist of qualifiers that
indicate the strength of the claim being made, backing, or additional data presented to
bolster the warrants, and a rebuttal, or statement specifying when the claim would not
follow from the data presented. Thus, the argument that auditors serve the public interest
might be diagrammed as shown in figure 1.
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Figure III-1: Model of the public interest argument
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The data originates in the demand for accurate and timely financial information by
external investors and creditors. This data leads to the claim that auditors are necessary
to attest to the accuracy of financial information based upon the warrants expressed in
agency theory. Namely, that self-interested managers will utilize their asymmetric
supply of financial information and access to company assets to extract company funded
perquisites. The rebuttal acts as a counter warrant, specifying at least one condition
under which the claim is not supported. Thus, if agency theory is wrong and managers
usually provide accurate and objective financial information of their performance, then
auditors are usually not needed. The qualifier acts as a modifier of the strength of the
argument or likelihood that the claim follows the data. In this case, I am not suggesting
that all managers try to mislead external users of financial information, but that some
will, and auditors are still probably necessary to reduce uncertainty among creditors and
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absentee owners. The sub-claim that auditors are necessary to attest financial
information becomes that data leading to the claim that auditors serve the public interest.
This claim is warranted by economic theory and backed by empirical data showing that
efficient markets increase economic growth and production. Economic growth and
production reduces scarcity while increasing aggregate utility among society as a whole.
In accordance with economic theory, increases in aggregate utility are beneficial to
society and hence, in the public interest. This claim should always follow unless
economic theory is wrong, or if auditors do not provide accurate information.

To the extent that accurate and objective information is a function of audit quality, we
can claim that high quality audits operate in the public interest. DeAngelo (1981) defines
audit quality as the conditional probability that an auditor will both discover a breach in a
client’s accounting system and report it. The ability of an auditor to discover a breach in
a client’s financial reporting system is based upon the expertise of the auditor. Expertise
consists of a combination of academic education, client specific knowledge and sufficient
general professional experience for the auditor to develop the knowledge structures
necessary to perform an audit. In order to counter the potential rebuttal that auditors are
not competent, the profession requires rigorous examination of new entrants, usually with
associated experience requirement, the endorsement of an experienced professional, and
continuing education requirements to maintain their level of expertise. However, the
ability of an auditor to detect a breach in a client’s financial reporting system does not
guarantee that the auditor will report the breach. The auditor must also correct or report
any breaches discovered. Thus, auditor expertise is a necessary, but not sufficient
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condition to audits serving the public interest. The conditional probability of an auditor
reporting a breach that they have detected is a measure of auditor independence
(DeAngelo, 1981). This definition may, in fact, be too simplistic since the efficient
functioning of capital markets requires not only the production of accurate and timely
information, but also the perception among investors and creditors that the information is
objective or unbiased.

The potential rebuttal that auditors lack independence is probably the most significant
threat to the accounting profession’s ability to maintain its self-regulating monopoly
status. This threat arises from the current market-like structure of the profession whereby
auditors are paid by clients to attest their financial information. Arguably, the direct
economic linkage between auditors and their clients provides an incentive to auditors to
withhold reporting any breaches discovered in a client’s reporting system in order to
protect their streams of income from audit fees. In response to this potential rebuttal, the
profession has developed several arguments that support an auditor’s ability to maintain
independence despite being directly paid by the client. These mitigating factors include
auditor’s fear of massive liability from securities litigation and their self-interested
motivation to protect other preexisting and future audit fees through maintenance of their
reputational capital (Becker, Defond & Jiambalvo, 1998; Pitt, 1997; DeAngelo, 1981).

The reputational capital argument asserts that firms with multiple income streams from
audit services will vigorously protect their economic interests by not allowing clients to
manage earnings or engage in otherwise aggressive accounting that might damage the
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audit firm’s reputation for independence and objectivity. This argument is warranted by
the belief that in free markets, clients will only hire auditors with a reputation for high
quality audits. To the extent that investors and creditors perceive an auditor to lack
independence reduces the ex-ante value of the audit to the client and the associated price
at which they are willing to pay. Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt (1997) argued “the
overwhelming economic interest of accounting firms in their reputational capital provides
a powerful incentive to safeguard independence.” DeAngelo (1981) argued that the
client specific quasi-rents auditors earn act as a collateral bond against opportunistic
behavior and increases audit quality, especially for larger firms who have more at stake
than smaller firms. This claim was empirically supported by Becker, Defond &
Jiambalvo (1998) who found that clients of smaller (non-Big6) auditors report more
income increasing discretionary accruals than large auditors. It was also argued that the
threat of massive liability from securities litigation should serve as a key deterrent to
improper behavior, ensuring auditor independence and high audit quality (Pitt, 1997).
This argument was backed by empirical results suggesting that auditors with lower
(higher) levels of litigation activity represent higher (lower) quality audit suppliers, and
that smaller (non-big8) audit firms have higher levels of litigation (Palmrose, 1988).

However, these arguments have been seriously challenged in recent years. For example,
the collapse of Enron erased about $66.5 billion in market capitalization over a matter of
months, wiping out the life savings of thousands of Enron employees and severely
damaging the portfolios of millions of other investors. Compounding this tragedy was
evidence that both Enron and Andersen upper management made millions of dollars in
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the process and then attempted to conceal or destroy evidence related to the collapse by
shredding thousands of documents and refusing to testify under oath. These events
attacked the core foundational premises underlying any logical claims that the U.S.
accounting profession (at the very least, Arthur Andersen) was serving the public interest.
Law enforcement and regulatory institutions were quick to reinforce the argument by
convicting Arthur Andersen, LLC of obstruction of justice and stripping it of its license
to audit public companies. David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of the Enron
audit, was also criminally charged and subjected to public humiliation in nationally
televised congressional hearings. The formality of the congressional setting, the angry
questioning and the emotional angst on the faces of the accused, all served as persuasive
rhetoric to reassure a wounded investing public that the regulatory system was properly
functioning in the public interest, and as a warning to other audit firms that such
opportunistic behavior would be swiftly and severely punished.

Market failures, such as Enron, illustrate the fact that auditors may not always serve the
public interest and that capital markets may not always be good for society. The question
remains, however, as to whether the public interest rhetoric of the profession represents
an achievable ideal communicated in good faith, or a cloak for the exploitation of
investors by large corporate interests and their accounting accomplices. The following
section explores this alternative perspective and evaluates evidence suggesting that the
public interest rhetoric may be instrumentally employed to protect the economic interests
of a professional cartel and their corporate sponsors to the detriment of society as a
whole.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS PROPAGANDA

“I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” Adam
Smith - Wealth of Nations, Chapter 2

Collison (2003) argues that large corporate interests have coordinated an extensive
campaign of propaganda over many years to maintain a climate wherein corporate selfinterest has become an end in itself, often at the expense of larger social interests.
Essentially, this view suggests that there has been an ongoing campaign through the
media to convince the public that laissez faire capitalism, the notion of market efficiency
and the adequacy of accounting measures as symbols of business success promote the
public interest despite evidence to the contrary. This perspective represents a challenge
to the claim that auditors serve the public interest, and the purpose of this section is to
outline the rebuttal argument. First, I suggest that the overwhelming extent to which the
profession has cloaked itself in the public interest has created a climate of “taken for
grantedness”, wherein the concept of the ‘public interest’ has been institutionally
embedded into the language of both the profession and the investing public, perpetuating
a façade that shields the self interested core of large corporations from scrutiny. Agents
of the government and the profession, both witting and unwitting, perpetuate this rhetoric
in mimetic fashion continuously solidifying the association between the profession and
the public interest until its use becomes almost invisible and obscured from critical
evaluation. I also suggest that the public interest rhetoric used by the accounting
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profession narrowly defines the term public interest while the public at large tend to
interpret the phrase in a more socially inclusive sense and argue that the accounting
profession instrumentally exploits this perceptual difference in meaning to convey a
sense of goodness regarding its activities to the public at large in order to advance its own
private interests and the private interests of its corporate and state sponsors.

The term ‘public interest’ as commonly employed in public discourse, usually refers to
the well being of a community of people. As such, it constitutes what is referred to as a
glittering and virtuous generality linked to the highly valued ideals of self-sacrifice and
benevolence (DOA, 1979). However, the term also has significant potential for
alternative meanings. All too frequently, the audience interprets the meaning of the
‘public interest’ to be something that is good for them privately as well, even when the
speaker is referring to a localized public with very specific interests. This is, according to
relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), because people cognitively attempt to
maximize the relevance of a communication according to the belief that it will be
meaningful, or relate to them personally. Each member of an audience subjectively
defines elastic terms such as the ‘public interest’ in context according to his/her own
personal lived experiences and normative values. This participation by the audience in
the construction of an argument helps make the ‘public interest’ a powerful rhetorical
tool that speakers can exploit for instrumental or strategic purposes.

I characterize the U.S. profession’s employment of public interest arguments as
propaganda because the rhetoric cannot be easily reconciled with observable behavior.
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Rather, the evidence suggests that the profession employs this rhetoric instrumentally in
an attempt to deflect criticism during times of crisis. Propaganda is defined as the
intentional spreading of ideas, facts, allegations, rumors or symbols in order to help or
injure an institution, cause or individual (M-W, 2004). Linebarger (1948, 1972) classifies
propaganda as white, grey or black. White propaganda originates from clearly
identifiable sources while the source of grey propaganda is not clearly identified, and
black propaganda attempts to intentionally mislead the audience into thinking the source
is other than the originator. Another form of propaganda, or more accurately, negative
propaganda, is censorship. Censorship is the practice of suppressing or deleting anything
objectionable in a message. The deletions may be obvious or obscured, and occur either
at the source of the message or during transmission to the audience. Enthymemes such as
“We serve the public interest” incorporate a form of censorship by omitting the
underlying warrants or sub-claims. As propaganda, enthymemes are better known as
slogans, and they can be very effective in moving an audience, even when the underlying
warrants are refutable. Thus, claims such as “the accounting profession serves the public
interest” can be seen as a form of self-evident propaganda, as slogans that are
simultaneously virtuous and deliberately vague. The intention is to move the audience
through emotion while appealing to the authority of the profession, interrupting any
attempt by the audience to determine whether its application is logical or valid.

Protecting Reputational Capital

Consider for example, statements made by Barry Melancon, president of the AICPA,
124

while appearing on national television immediately following the congressional hearing
on Andersen’s role in Enron collapse, where Duncan “pleaded the 5th” and refused to
answer questions on whether Andersen engaged in wide spread document shredding to
hide their involvement. In response to the pointed question of whether the accounting
profession could be trusted, Melancon replied with a classic form of rhetorical
parallelism known as the tri-colon. “Well, certainly the accounting profession can be
trusted. This profession has over 100 years of credibility, over 100 years of meeting the
public interest and, in fact, has been a critical component of the success and
transparencies of the best capital markets in world here in America2 .” Note that the first
two phrases set up the expectation that there will be a third. The slight change in the
third phrase renders it more emphatic and highlights the emotional appeal to American
patriotism. The fact that American capital markets had been suffering a series of massive
audit failures over several years wiping out billions of dollars in market capitalization
was left unstated, leaving the audience to fill in the gap with culturally ingrained warrants
concerning the benefits of free markets and the value of audits.

The unwanted publicity and public scrutiny that followed these crises motivated the
accounting profession to launch extensive campaigns of so-called advertorials to bolster
its image and protect its reputational capital. However, reconciling the rhetoric of these
advertorials with the profession’s behavior is again, somewhat problematic. For
example, in December 2002, KPMG launched an ad campaign in the Wall Street Journal
under the title "Regaining Investors' Trust: A Resolution We Plan to Keep" promising to
take the lead in “restoring professional credibility to the accounting profession.”
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Coincidentally, KPMG had just been slapped with a lawsuit by the Missouri Department
of Insurance for advising General Life Insurance Co. to develop and sell so called ‘Stable
Value’ funding arrangements that forced its parent, General American Holding Company
into receivership. “Among the allegations, the lawsuit claims KPMG concealed
information, failed to disclose the insurance company's several-billion-dollar liability
exposure and failed to exercise due care in performing audits. The suit also says KPMG
tried to cover up its actions during the state's investigation of the company's liquidity
crisis3.” The apparent inconsistency between the rhetoric of the advertorial, the context
in which it was offered and the alleged behavior leads us to classify this campaign as
propaganda. In a similar manner, PriceWaterhouseCoopers placed full-page ads in
January of 2003, under the banner “Stand and be Counted” while simultaneously under
fire for using aggressive accounting to overstate earnings by $382 million over three
years at Tyco International. In these ads, PWC proclaimed they would “ask the tough
questions and tackle the tough issues4” and promised to resign from any audit where they
had concerns of about the quality of information they were receiving from management.
As propaganda, the “Stand And Be Counted” campaign attempts to conflate the practice
of auditing with broader public interest groups through a process of association. The
slogan, “Stand And Be Counted” is used by a variety of other public interest groups
supporting everything from freedom of speech5 to the environment and human rights6.
The goal of the campaign appears to be self-serving by transferring the positive qualities
of broader societal concerns to the accounting profession during a time of crisis.

As previously noted, the reputational capital argument is based on the assumption that the
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market will punish audit firms for helping CEOs and CFOs manage earnings and extract
perquisites. However, the empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between
auditor reputation, audit quality and marketability may in fact, be inverted. A pattern of
hire, fraud, fire and re-hire among the large accounting firms and their corporate clients
casts doubt on the credibility of this argument. For example, in October 2001, Xerox
fired its auditor KPMG, who had helped them overstate earnings by $2 billion over three
years, replacing them with PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). In October 2003, Sprint
hired KPMG after firing Ernst & Young for selling questionable tax shelters to its CEO
and CFO. In June 2002, following a $2.5 billion fraud, Adelphia fired Deloitte and
Touche and hired PWC, yet in January 2004, after allowing a $382 million overstatement
of earnings, Tyco fired PWC and hired Deloitte and Touche who, incidentally, had just
been fired by Parmalat after a $5 billion dollar fraud was uncovered there. Not
surprisingly, Parmalat replaced Deloitte and Touche with PWC. The examples seem
endless, leading one to the conclusion that once a firm demonstrates a willingness and
ability to help executives manage earnings and/or construct complicated tax shelters, their
services are in even greater demand by others.

Extending Jurisdictional Claims

Another area where the profession has invoked the public interest argument for selfserving purposes is with respect to extending its traditional claims beyond the audit
function. Here the argument is that the provision of consulting services aids the audit
function by improving client knowledge and broadening the revenue base of audit firms
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making them less reliant on a single client. Pitt (1997) claimed there was no empirical
evidence that non-audit services harmed audit quality, and that “regulatory concern over
non-audit services is, at best, unfounded. At worst, it is contrary to the public interest7.”
The reasoning Pitt offered was that, “Non-audit services increase the firm’s investment in
reputational capital, contribute importantly to the quality of audit services and provide
other benefits to clients and the public8.” William Balhoff, Chairman of the AICPA
Public Companies Practice Section, subsequently stated in congressional testimony
related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that, “to the extent that consulting services provide
information to management, we are working in the public interest. We are helping those
companies, whether they are listed or nonlisted companies, to better run their companies.
I think that is a public interest 9.” This statement appears to draw on the 1950’s slogan,
“What’s good for the country is good for General Motors and vice versa.10” The
intention is to argue that despite the massive audit failure at Enron, auditors should be
allowed to provide consulting services to their clients.

Federal Policy Formation

Perhaps the most influential arena in which the profession has waged its war of
propaganda is in Congress. Beginning in the early 1990s, the strategy of the AICPA and
the Big 5 firms changed from one of dealing with regulators to one of directly influencing
legislators who were in positions to affect the content of legislation of interest to the
profession. During this time, the profession joined in the political action committee
(PAC) game to directly lobby and support specific congressional candidates. However,
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the profession’s willingness to assume the role of unbiased and objective guide on
diverse public issues raises questions regarding the extent and execution of their selfproclaimed public interest responsibilities. When debating rules and regulations before
standard setting bodies, the profession argues that exposure to litigation liability serves
the public interest by providing a deterrent to anti-social behavior while simultaneously
engaging in a campaign to reduce auditor liability through lobbying efforts and direct
campaign contributions to legislators. The U.S. profession’s involvement in federal
policymaking and contracting has become so intense that the AICPA and the Big four
firms are now major financial contributors to congressional election campaigns and highprofile lobbyists (Roberts, Dwyer and Sweeney, 2003; Dwyer and Roberts, 2004).

One of the first concerted efforts to influence federal legislation having a direct economic
impact on audit firms was the battle over the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (Avery, 1996). Roberts, et al. (2003) document the extensive use of PAC
contributions and lobbying activities that the profession engaged in to secure passage of
this legislation despite opposition by the attorney’s bar, consumer groups and state
securities regulators. This act contained at least two provisions of extreme interest to the
accounting profession. The first was the ‘fair-share’ proportionate liability rule that
helped shield audit firms from the potentially massive liability resulting from large audit
failures. The second provision provided caps on the actual amount of damages that audit
firms would be required to pay investors. Both of these legal provisions appear to
undermine the strength of the litigation liability argument supporting auditor
independence.
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Another example of the profession’s involvement with federal policy making was
documented by Roberts and Bobek (2004) in the debate over the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997. Their findings illustrate the inherently political process of tax legislation and the
differential economic effects these policies have both within and across industries. The
AICPA announced its role in creating this piece of legislation by “submitting written and
oral testimony to both houses of Congress and supporting particular provisions of both
bills with visits to Capital Hill members and staff.” (Padwe, 1998; pp. 122). Some
critics called this legislation a political fraud stating, “The tax bill may be good for some
clients and at least do no harm to the nation. But the real winners are accountants
themselves.” (Telberg, 1997).

While the leaders of the CPA profession continue to claim that these activities are part of
the public accounting profession’s commitment to meet its public interest duty, I submit
that there is a fundamental difference between providing advice to clients regarding their
tax situation or financial reporting and providing advice to federal legislators regarding
the effects of tax and securities litigation legislation. The former falls within the
profession’s view of client advocacy, while the latter contains far-reaching consequences
regarding the distribution of economic burdens among various publics to which the
profession claims to be dedicated to serve. I also believe the profession’s willingness to
use its public interest obligation as a justification to support or oppose potential federal
legislation having a material positive economic impact on its members such arguments
contestable.
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While the foregoing examples challenge the benevolent motivations of the profession, the
evidence supporting a presumption of coordinated and pervasive ill-intent is far from
conclusive. Moreover, in the following section I suggest that any conclusions regarding
the intentions of the authors or the meaning of the rhetoric are merely provisional. Once
the rhetoric of the public interest ideal is published, the author is no longer in control of
its meaning. Rather, the final determination of meaning resides with the audience.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS MYTH

“He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how
much he is promoting it.” Adam Smith – Wealth of Nations – Chapter 2

The term myth, as I employ it here, should not be interpreted necessarily as imputing
anything fictional or false, although that is frequently the case. Rather I use the term to
refer to the embodiment of ideals and institutions in a society, including its dominant
political doctrine and extant norms and values. My concept of myth is based in part on
De Saussure’s (1959) semiotic scheme as elaborated on by Barthes (1957) and adapted
by Macintosh (2002) and Puxty (1993). In Saussure’s system of signs, each sign consists
of two parts: a signifier and a signified. The signifier is the word or token used to
indicate the signified. The signified is the mental image created in the mind of the writer
and reader of the actual object, or referent. To the extent that objects and ideas exist
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independently in a real and objective world, language can be seen as a method for naming
them. However, Barthes contribution suggests that signifieds become signifiers as soon
as they are evoked in a second order system of signs. The new signifiers represent preexisting myths or language-objects that consist of their own language material, a
constellation of signifiers that can be used to create new signs in a never ending chain of
embedded meaning. Thus, no final or natural term can ever be stripped from a signifier
and meaning is never fixed.

For example, the term “accountant” is a signifier referring to the idea of an accountant,
the signified. The referent is the actual person. The idea of an accountant pre-exists in
the in the mind of the speaker or writer who, drawing from a constellation of signs, utters
a word or inscribes some symbols onto a medium of communication to be interpreted by
an audience or reader. The sign also exists as a myth or language–object in the minds
readers who interpret the sign and create an image in their own mind. As a language
object, the myth consists of a constellation of signifiers, each of which can in turn
represent the final term of the first semiotic system. The word “accountant” is itself
empty of meaning, and gets ‘filled-up’ with the myth of the clever tax consultant, the
experienced business consultant or the independent auditor, depending upon the
interpretation of the reader. As the symbols are interpreted, the meaning of accountant
shifts instantaneously into any one of the signifiers comprising the myth. The myth and
its associated signifiers can then become the first terms in a second order semiotic system
giving rise to new signs, and so on. For example, in continuing the semiotic chain, the
reader may interpret “accountant” to mean the clever tax consultant who helps hard
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working entrepreneurs avoid the excessive demands of the state, or the independent
auditor who ensures fair play among market participants. Following this chain of
meaning, the signifier ‘accountant’ embodies a constellation of elements, including the
politics of capitalism, the institutions of free markets, the standards of reliable financial
reporting and the professional ideals of competence, independence and objectivity.
Alternative chains of meaning, however, can be found in the underprivileged signifiers
simultaneously embedded in the myth. These signifiers are represented as the binary
opposites of the privileged signifiers. Rather than clever tax consultant or independent
auditor, “accountant” may be interpreted as the shifty servant of greedy and exploitive
corporations paid to help them evade their legitimate social responsibilities and exploit
investors. Regardless, once invoked the meaning of the signified can shift sideways one
way or the other, becoming the signifier in a subsequent chain of meaning. Determining
which perspective is the “Truth” remains undecidable. Is the accountant a pedant
bookkeeper, a professional auditor, a clever consultant or an unimaginative bean-counter?
What grounds do we have for our faith in the reality of the referent, or in our ability to
accurately interpret the intention in mind of the writer? My argument suggests that
language contains no transcendental “Truth”, only localized truths within particular
discourses, yet these ideas are immanent to our language and dominate the way we
understand.

Identifying the referent of the ‘public interest’, assuming it is real, is more problematic.
The Miriam-Webster Dictionary Online reports no less than 28 entries for ‘public’ and 13
entries for ‘interest’, any combination of which could theoretically provide a distinct
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meaning or referent. In the case of the public interest, it appears the sign has become the
master, not the servant. As a language-object, the public interest ideal is associated with
multiple, simultaneous and contradictory myths.

Theories of linguistic relativity suggest that different groups, each with their own unique
history and knowledge structures, will create different linguistic codes and meanings that
in turn, mediate the perceptual cognitive processes group members use to define their
social environment (Belkaoui, 1995; Belkaoui, 1980). At its limit, this thesis suggests the
lexical register of a language directly limits the cognitive ability of speakers to organize
their thoughts. This is based on the assertion that all thinking goes on in language, that
language may distort thinking and that languages differ in the thoughts they afford us.
That is, the words and symbols contained in a language and privileged in discursive
practices directly enable, influence and constrain the thoughts of its users. Thus, the
discursive practices of different social groups will create multiple referents of the public
interest ideal depending upon how the myth is privileged within their lexical register.

Typical discourse in the accounting profession privileges the myth that auditors serve the
public interest by ensuring accurate and reliable financial reports that provide critical
information necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets. On the other hand,
discourse in law privileges the myth that lawyers serve the public interest by providing
free legal services to the indigent, poor and persecuted while discourse in medicine
privileges the myth that doctors serve the public interest by monitoring and safeguarding
society against outbreaks of disease, educating the public in healthful practices and caring
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for ill and aged. A plethora of other groups also purport to serve the public interest by
raising social consciousness on issues of free speech, the environment, preventing child
and spousal abuse or supporting human rights, etc. Once we understand the public
interest ideal as a collection of privileged myths, and as such, value laden and temporary,
we can attempt to demystify it through a deconstructive reading.

Deconstruction as Method

Deconstruction is a theory of reading that aims to undermine the logic of opposition
within a text. Forged in the writings of Jacques Derrida (1982) a deconstructive reading
presupposes that meaning is unstable and attempts to ‘unpack’ a text in order to
understand the rhetorical steps taken to arrive at its central meaning. Developing a clear
and coherent discussion of deconstruction as a methodology for the social sciences is
problematic since precise definitions are antithetical to its fundamental assumptions
regarding knowledge and discourse. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to
describe Derrida’s project and incorporate deconstruction into their epistemological
arsenal, most notably by proponents of the poststructuralist critique (Macintosh, 2002;
Truex, Baskerville & Travis, 2000; Kilduff, 1993; Cooper, 1989; Cooper & Burrell,
1988).

The value of deconstruction seems to be in its ability to reveal the simultaneous and
contradictory attitudes present in a specific text or discourse and the inherent instability
between what is written and what is read, or what is spoken and what is heard.
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Knowledge and Truth are not assumed to exist externally in a ‘real’ world. Rather, they
are recognized by what they are not. Words are recognized and interpreted according to
their metaphysical relationship to all other words in a language. This conscious
recognition and interpretation is a result of, or an effect of, what Derrida refers to as
Differánce.

Differánce is a crucial word-concept of Derrida’s process of deconstruction. However,
differánce is difficult to understand, if not impossible to discuss. Derrida coined the term
based on a pun that seems amusing only in the original French in which he discusses it.
Differénce (with an é) is a French homonym, meaning both to differ (spatially) and to
defer (temporally). Differánce (with an á) is a homophone that Derrida created in
philosophical discourse as a textual illustration of the metaphysical cleavage between
thoughts. At risk of oversimplifying this word-concept, and at risk of falling into the
bottomless pit of metaphysical discourse, I describe differánce as ‘not’ or ‘naught’, and
as such, a ‘knot’. Metaphysically, differánce may refer to the cleavage between mind and
soul that allows the emergence of consciousness, or the perception of Being. However,
since the “perception of Being” implies a spatial and temporal difference between mind
and soul, consciousness must exist as a third party observer. In this third party status as
observer, consciousness is both mind and soul while simultaneously being neither.

The idea then of differánce is an attempt to describe the imperceptible and inaudible
space between ideas, sounds or words that allow us to differentiate them as being
separate and distinct from one another. It does not and cannot exist, because if it did,
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then it would become a mid-point between two concepts, creating a new idea that is itself
only an effect of differánce. Derrida’s pun of substituting the á in differánce further
illustrates this cleavage between thought and language, and between speaking and
writing, in text, but not in speech. The á represents the not/naught between symbols and
the undecidability, or ambivalence of language.

Deconstruction recognizes and embraces the ambivalence of language, the simultaneous
and contradictory manner in which meaning is inscribed and ascribed to text. For
example, we can define light and dark in binary opposition to one another, yet they merge
together in the middle of a dusky continuum. Likewise, life and death stand in opposition
to one another, yet chemical processes continue and cells divide while doctors and clerics
debate the precise moment of termination. The process of a deconstructive reading is
fluid and challenges the privileged myths, opening up space for repressed or marginalized
interpretations. Thus, a deconstructive reading lends itself to critique. Definitions are
unstable and meaning is ultimately undecidable because differánce always allows the
opening up of another space between meanings, providing a jumping off point for new
meaning in unknown directions. Symbols are inscribed by writers in a process of
reflection and subsequently interpreted by readers who ascribe new or expanded
meanings to them. These in turn, are disseminated within a community in new
directions, threading through and beyond the original idea or memory trace present in the
mind of the author, creating ongoing chains of signification that seem to take on lives of
their own much like the stalks, stems and flowers of a plant. The fruitions of which are
only temporary and fall away to seed new ideas and new discourse concerning topics not
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yet conceived. Cooper (1989; p488) uses the metaphor of ideas being transported in “a
vehicle that has no substance, by a driver whom one cannot see, and to a destination that
one can never know.”

Metaphors are useful here because they describe through

analogy, illustration and example, yet they ‘prove’ nothing. At best, they provide a
perspective from which to understand a problem. The main point being that, it is not the
destination of the vehicle, or the color of the flower that is important. Rather, it is the
process of recognition. Meaning is always on the move.

Deconstructing the public interest

Given the assumptions of differánce and undecidability, how can a deconstruction of the
public interest ideal proceed? The word seems to imply some sort of reverse
engineering, or taking apart. However, any attempt to define deconstruction by fixing it
in place and establishing rigid procedures for its method is antithetical to its philosophical
underpinnings. Specifying an ordered set of procedures merely privileges one hierarchy
over another that can, and should, in turn, be deconstructed. One might also ask, “What
are the correct procedures for appreciating a work of art?” Can such “procedures” even
be articulated? Even if they can, the “procedures” that work for one observer, listener, or
type of art may differ from one another. Consider for example, the popular optical
illusion of the old woman and the young woman. By concentrating on a particular pattern
in the illusion, an image of an old woman’s face covered in a scarf may emerge.
Alternatively, a viewer may see a young woman in a shawl. Usually, only one pattern can
be seen at a time since the eye of the old woman becomes the ear of the young woman in
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the alternative rendition. The body of one image is simultaneously the outline of the
other, and privileging one picture distracts our attention, pushing the other image into the
background. Differánce then, can be described as the process of deferring a pattern of
differences. Deconstruction is differánce in action, a way of seeing those things deferred
out of our awareness by our concentration on the privileged picture. Regardless of the
procedures given, some people, no matter how long they look at the illusion, will see only
one picture and not the other.

Nevertheless, in following Macintosh (2002) and Truex, et al (2000), I will attempt to
deconstruct the public interest by developing alternative semiotic chains of meaning, each
privileging different assumptions leading to different and admittedly, only provisional
conclusions. As a first step I identify and arrange crucial words (signifiers) surrounding
the public interest ideal into a metaphysical hierarchy, juxtaposing them against their
binary opposites such that one side is privileged as being better than the other. For the
public interest, this binary opposite might be identified as private gain.

The public interest is usually associated with the common concerns of a community of
people, country or locality. As such it represents a reified signifier of the aggregate
concerns, claims and interests of a society as opposed to an individual. As a second or
third order semiotic symbol, the public interest can also be associated with a constellation
of words that surround and intersect its meaning. These might include words like selfsacrifice, benevolence, good, and perhaps, ultimately, God. As an aggregation of
individual concerns, the public interest is given more weight, or a higher priority, than the
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interests of a single individual or possibly even a subset of individuals. The individual is
subservient to the public, and in this privileged position, the public has the right to
demand sacrifice from the individual for the welfare of the whole. The privileged
assumption also holds that it is the public’s disposition to do good for itself by providing
greater aggregate happiness, well-being and prosperity to its members. Likewise,
benevolence, as it is commonly interpreted, is the value of gifting this sacrifice to the
community out of kindness. However, it also has etymological roots as the compulsory
levy made by English kings having no other authority than the claim of prerogative.
Thus, at its limit, this semiotic chain might end in the aggregation of all humanity,
signified by God, who created Man in His image, and by whose Word, Man must live.

At this point, I can also reveal the negatively associated semiotic chain of reasoning that
marginalizes private gain to the public interest. The word-objects surrounding this
semiotic chain might include self-seeking, greed and evil. Private gain, as the self-sought
relative increases in advantage, privilege and resources acquired by individuals does not
in and of itself necessarily connote something negative. However, given the assumptions
of resource scarcity, it can be argued that to the extent self-sought accumulation of
advantages is excessive and made at the expense of other members, that private gain is
somehow reprehensible. Onto-theologically, the proclivity for excessive and
reprehensible acquisitiveness is known as greed, a sin that spawns covetous retaliation by
the less privileged and disturbs the order of society. In contrast the public interest reifies
the concept of universal benevolence and the value of selfless sacrifice for the common
good.
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In the second step, I reverse the hierarchy by privileging the opposite side of the public
interest argument. In this way, I can derive a different constellation of signifiers that
privilege private gain. These signifiers, grounded in the cultural values of freedom and
individualism, exist in a chain of reasoning that justifies the rationality of capitalism and
the productive and distributive efficiencies of the market. Under this perspective,
privately gained privilege and advantage are produced through an ethic of individual
effort and ability. To the extent that these advantages arise independently, the individual
responsible for their creation has right to their ownership, including all future production
arising from them. The extension of property rights to the future production of
individually created advantage also rationalizes the potential unlimited accumulation of
wealth. As the underprivileged binary opposite of private gain, the public interest
marginalizes the collective against the individual, socialism against capitalism and state
sponsored paternalism against individual freedom. This semiotic chain of reasoning
might demonize the state by portraying taxation and regulation as unnecessary intrusions
on the inalienable right of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These
arguments may also be warranted by economic theory and backed by empirical evidence
that state regulated economies have proven unduly restrictive and inefficient in allocating
resources. Ultimately, this perspective believes in the morality of the market, the
aggregation of private interests as the common good and elevates the rationality and
achievement of the individual over the state. Maintenance of this perspective also
requires the protection of capitalistic institutions, such as free markets, personal property
rights and the unrestricted accumulation of wealth.
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The third and final step of my deconstruction reveals how any fixed meaning is
unsustainable. I can argue that the myths of capitalism and market efficiency are
unsustainable due to the unrealistic assumptions the underlying economic theory. Among
these is the assumption that market participants have perfect information regarding all
existing and potential stocks of resources as well as each other’s respective utility
functions. Compounding this shortcoming is the vagueness of the notion of utility and
the inadequacy of currency as its proxy measure. Utility is a somewhat unclear notion
equivalent to satisfaction or the preference by individuals for some goods, tangible or
intangible, over others. However, even given the assumption that we could somehow
measure utility, the notion that it can be rank ordered, traded and consumed attributes
properties to it that simply do not exist. For example, happiness, satisfaction and love are
all components of utility, yet they are not diminished by their consumption or devalued
by their accumulation. Thus, the nature of utility contradicts the fundamental assumptions
of scarcity and diminishing marginal valuation and undermines any rationality for its
exchange.

Unfortunately, this argument suffers from flaws in its assumptions as well. The
legitimacy of any inference as to what the true interests at stake are can be challenged
both subjectively and objectively. I can argue that economic theory is not meant to be a
depiction of reality; that it’s true value lies in its ability to predict human behavior and
that it’s assumptions are merely convenient simplifications oriented toward that end.
Empirical observations of self-interested utility maximizing economic man
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simultaneously confirm our greatest hope and our worst fear: Economic man is
predictably amoral. Fortunately, economic man is only a theoretical reification of a
pattern of behavior that can in turn be deferred. In differánce, we see the evolution of the
state as a mechanism to correct for this moral deficiency using the public interest as
justification.

Pleasence and Maclean (1998) describe the public interest as a hopelessly ambiguous
term with practical difficulties in establishing both its nature and magnitude. The public
is first reified from the abstract and defined as a thing in itself, much like the term
“American”. Thus, any interest attributed to the public is not any form of shared interest,
but an interest of a defined public of indeterminate size and composition.
Notwithstanding the phantasmic reification of a public as a collection of individuals, the
distinction of “interests” also eludes us in the process of differánce. Ideological interests
represent interests in moral values while material interests are more concerned with
property and consumption. However, in the ambivalence of differánce, material interests
that are considered vital or concerned with subsistence simultaneously become
ideological interests in their effect on the extent or character of the public’s existence.

Since language offers only crude approximations, a precise articulation of the public
interest is unavailable. However, the listening mind needs totality, relevance and closure,
and so draws on conscious and unconscious memory traces acquired from lived
experience to complete the sign and create the myth. Existentially, the public interest
may or may not exist, yet in the mind of the audience, its meaning is constructed,
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interpreted and extended. The public interest is imagined and a unique meaning is
impressed upon the mind of the audience. The deconstruction of the public interest then,
results in virtually whomever, and whatever the speaker intends during the context of any
specific discourse. Moreover, since the intent of a speaker cannot be accurately
formulated and transmitted through language, the public interest simultaneously becomes
whomever and whatever the audience wishes to interpret it as.

PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to explore the nature of accounting profession’s rhetoric
regarding its public interest ideal. In the first section, I presented the logical argument,
consistent with the functionalist perspective that auditors serve the public interest by
maintaining the orderly functioning of commerce. These claims are warranted by the
theories of agency and neo-classical economics, backed by empirical observation and
qualified to the extent that auditors are both competent and independent. In support of
auditor independence, I presented the arguments that both the auditor’s economic interest
in their reputational capital and their fear of massive liability arising from litigation
motivate them to remain independent and objective in their financial reporting. These
arguments rely on the widely held belief among the American investing audience that a
free market will ‘weed-out’ or punish firms that engage in anti-social behavior. I also
presented evidence that the state supports these arguments by punishing individuals and
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firms in public displays of interrogation and humiliation.

In the second section, I presented evidence that indicates the leaders of the accounting
profession and their agents instrumentally perpetuate the myth of the public interest ideal
through slogans, advertorial campaigns and white papers in order to maintain their status
as a self-regulating monopoly. In rebuttal to the neoclassical economic arguments, I
presented evidence that in the market for audit services, a firm’s economic interest in
their reputational capital does not necessarily mitigate pro-management and anti-social
behavior, at least for the largest accounting firms. Despite having been implicated in
numerous financial frauds and questionable tax shelters, the reputations of the Big Four
firms seems intact as evidenced by their continuing ability to secure large audit
engagements and sell new services. Following a crisis the lead partners and executives
clumsy enough to “get caught” are singled out for punishment and public humiliation
while the profession responds with a multi-pronged campaign of propaganda to bolster its
image and restore its reputation. They accomplish this by resigning from engagements,
blaming individual partners and CEOs, running massive advertorial campaigns and
swapping clients among themselves in a highly concentrated monopolistic market.
Treating each audit failure as an isolated incident of individual greed perpetrated under
the guise of responsible professional stewardship simply protects the reputation of the
profession allowing it to retain its self regulating status and continue to extract monopoly
rents from the market. Likewise, in undermining the argument that massive liability from
securities litigation ensures auditor independence, we see the profession invoking the
public interest ideal in order to influence legislation concerning proportionate liability
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provisions and caps on litigation damages. They accomplish this by providing written
and oral testimony, paying direct cash contributions to legislators, visiting the offices of
Congressmen and their staff and making emotional appeals to the public through the
business media.

In the final analysis, I illustrate that the profession’s claim of public service is
undecidable. This is because the public interest is emotionally loaded word with little or
no rational content. When used before a receptive audience, the ‘public interest’ can act
as a virtuous word with significant potential to transfer positive qualities to the
accounting profession and create favorable associations between past or pending events
and the audience’s personal welfare. However, if delivered before a cynical audience,
this strategy can backfire. The logical arguments supporting the accounting profession’s
claim of public service can be refuted, exposing the rhetoric as an attempt to
instrumentally manipulate an unsuspecting audience. Thus my provisional conclusion is
an admonishment to the accounting profession. In order to be effective, the rhetoric of
the public interest must be used in a manner consistent with the expectations of the
audience and it would be a mistake to underestimate the depth of their perception. Hatch
(1988) warns speakers that, “Americans admire professionals for their dedication to
public service and revile them for the extent to which such claims serve as masks for
financial greed.”
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